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Executive Summary 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this report is to provide a basis for stakeholder engagement activities in 
relation to the monitoring of facilities for the geological disposal of radioactive waste. 
The report views monitoring as a combined socio-technical activity central to the 
pursuit of safe repository operation and staged closure. It sees monitoring for long-term 
safety as a field driven as much by social and institutional innovation as by technical 
innovation. The report is organised into three main sections which discuss in turn: 
expert views on monitoring, drawing on interview and documentary data; the role of 
monitoring in building stakeholder confidence, drawing on experience in other contexts; 
and monitoring as a socio-technical activity, focusing on the basis for social trust.  
 
2. Expert Views on Monitoring 
The investigation of expert views of monitoring drew on two sources of data: key 
international technical documents and interviews with 18 experts (mainly technical 
specialists) from radioactive waste management and research organisations.  
 
For the experts interviewed, monitoring is about collecting information on the 
repository system, mainly for purposes of decision-making. More specifically, it is about 
observing through measurements the behaviour and impact of the repository system. 
For the technical partners in the MoDeRn project the focus is on confirming that 
repositories will perform as required and that the basic safety assumptions are correct. 
In addition, however, assurance and confidence building were mentioned by all 
respondents as being one of the main drivers for monitoring. Three distinct aspects of 
this role of monitoring were identified:  
 
1. Monitoring to assure the implementer 
2. Monitoring to assure the regulator 
3. Monitoring to reassure the public and build confidence in the repository 
 
Most experts interviewed had not yet explicitly discussed monitoring strategies with 
local stakeholders. Many therefore found it difficult to anticipate what lay stakeholder 
expectations of monitoring might be and whether it would be technically feasible to 
meet them. Several respondents expressed the view that local stakeholders were likely 
to be more interested in environmental rather than near field monitoring, and in post-
closure rather than operational monitoring. 
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The technical specialists saw post-closure monitoring to provide additional assurance of 
post-closure safety, particularly if this were to involve monitoring of internal or near-
field processes, as a major challenge. Developing the tools and techniques necessary for 
such monitoring was considered by many of our respondents to be more a question of 
R&D than of engineering and implementing an already available solution. 
 
Two elements are crucial here. The first is that of reconciling the need to monitor 
processes within the repository with the principle of passive safety by developing non-
intrusive monitoring techniques. Therefore many respondents explicitly referred to 
post-closure in situ monitoring as unrealistic and potentially counterproductive. In 
addition to answering the question of how to monitor safely, however, there is also 
continuing discussion about what should be measured, i.e. which specific processes – or 
parameters that, in the relatively short period before closure, would provide data 
conclusive enough to accurately predict future system behaviour. This has both 
implications for post-closure and pre-closure monitoring. The general position taken by 
the experts interviewed, was that it will be possible to identify measurable parameters 
that would enable them to validate (and if need be adjust) the models on which they 
build their safety cases, but only a very few. 
 
3. Stakeholders, Monitoring and Confidence 
A review of literature on citizen and stakeholder engagement with monitoring identified 
examples from the nuclear sector and from other contexts that offer useful insights into 
stakeholder concerns, institutional arrangements and monitoring practices, as well as 
drawing out implications for stakeholder confidence.  
 
Most of the activities reported involve some sort of environmental monitoring. 
Furthermore, although there is evidence of a variety of modes of organisation of 
monitoring, one important feature was the extent to which a participatory approach has 
been adopted. This aspect is singled out in the report because it is consistent with the 
turn to collaborative or partnership-based approaches, involving the active engagement 
of stakeholders, which has been adopted by radioactive waste management 
programmes in many countries, typically as a response to lack of stakeholder trust in 
implementing organisations or confidence in the safety of geological disposal.  
 
The review found many examples of environmental monitoring commissioned or 
conducted by local institutional stakeholders, particularly local government, including 
some examples that integrate this with monitoring of the socioeconomic environment. 
There are also several examples from the USA of monitoring for radiological 
contamination following known releases due to nuclear weapons testing, as well as the 
accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant. Dissatisfaction with or distrust of 
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institutions has also led members of some communities to demand or even initiate 
participatory environmental monitoring. In the field of radioactive waste and other 
nuclear industry facilities, there is considerable evidence of stakeholder and citizen 
involvement in monitoring activities. Although they are for the most part not associated 
with geological disposal facilities they point to the desire of citizens and communities in 
many different contexts for active engagement with monitoring programmes.  
 
The examples discussed, although drawn from varied contexts, tend to report positive 
effects of such involvement for stakeholders, typically local citizens and community 
organisations, and for their relationships with experts, regulators and decision makers. 
Reported outcomes include increased confidence in programmes, operators, regulators 
and scientific experts, and the added value of enhanced social capital and community 
capacities, although not all of these could be shown to have resulted in all contexts. 
Nevertheless it is important to be cautious about the potential outcomes of such 
engagement programmes in light of the well-documented challenges of participation. 
 
4. Monitoring: a Combined Technical and Social Activity 
It is clear from our research that the expert community recognises monitoring to have 
both technical and social purposes. While there are strong technical reasons for 
monitoring a geological repository, questions of evidence, confidence and decision-
making always have, to a greater or lesser extent, a social component.  
 
The prevailing paradigm for geological disposal today is one of continuous vigilance. 
This is by and large a matter of social preference: a result of how society today 
interprets nuclear safety.  The technical act of monitoring and the way its results are 
given meaning then become an important instrument in the pursuit of vigilance. This is 
particularly the case for nuclear installations such as power plants, fuel production or 
reprocessing plants, and storage facilities. Deep geological repositories, in their inherent 
reliance on passive safety, can be understood as a way of trying to renegotiate the need 
for tireless vigilance. The question is then how to interpret this need for surveillance: 
How much vigilance is enough and how should it be organised? This is a societal 
question that cannot be answered from a technical-expert perspective alone. 
 
Lay stakeholder views on what monitoring can and should contribute to long-term 
safety of a repository are likely to differ to those of experts, due to fundamentally 
different views on what it means to stay vigilant and for how long. This is because 
society at large may not be as confident as the expert community that it is possible to 
ensure (safe) long term repository behaviour. These doubts arise for many reasons, but 
are at least partially based on known cases of institutional and technological failure. 
Another reason is the concern that some risk will remain due to the impossibility of 
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foreseeing all contingencies; yet expert statements on repository safety that do not 
acknowledge such uncertainties may not be perceived as trustworthy. 
 
The concept of trust is important in understanding the underlying mechanisms on how 
monitoring may or may not contribute to building confidence in geological disposal. 
Given the imperceptible nature of radiation citizens have little choice but to rely on 
experts and expert systems to ensure their safety. However, Eurobarometer surveys 
reveal considerable national variation in attitudes towards scientists and experts, with 
citizens in many countries displaying public ambivalence and even overt distrust 
towards the institutions that employ them. 
 
Cultivating good personal relationships can contribute to establishing and maintaining a 
degree of trust between individuals who interact regularly but this has limitations when 
considering whole institutions and large groups of stakeholders. The alternative to 
interpersonal trust is to establish mechanisms that underwrite trust in the (impersonal) 
activities of institutions; in the case of a radioactive waste repository this may include 
giving specific consideration to roles and responsibilities with regard to monitoring, to 
creating transparency and to maintaining vigilance. 
 
For society to decide how much vigilance is needed and for how long will require 
confidence in the repository system and trust in those responsible for designing, 
implementing, overseeing and regulating it. It may be easier for social actors to commit 
to the successive stages of concept development, siting, licensing, construction and 
operation, if the provisional nature of their trust is acknowledged and there is at each 
stage the opportunity to evaluate and reconsider their commitment.  
 
Monitoring can also help to demonstrate that the operator of the disposal programme is 
aware that there are uncertainties involved and is willing to take appropriate 
precautions. The risk associated with such openness is that it may appear to bring into 
question the premise of passive safety as the technical solution to the societal problem 
of vigilance engendered by higher activity radioactive wastes. By introducing the notion 
of retrievability or reversibility into law, however, some countries are already moving 
towards an adapted sociotechnical solution: one that still relies on achieving passive 
safety, but which recognises that this end point may be further away than initially 
planned and, subject to future societal decisions, may not be final. Such evolutions 
remind us that we will inevitably pass the burden of decision about final closure to 
subsequent generations. Acknowledging this requires that we think more specifically 
about the type of information, knowledge and skills that need to be passed on to future 
generations, and the role that monitoring might play in meeting the needs of future 
operators, regulators, decision-makers and affected citizens.  
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5. Concluding Observations 
The exploratory stakeholder engagement exercises planned in the next phase of this 
research will build upon this review and are intended to supplement the inferences, 
reported above, that we have drawn from the research literature. In this final section we 
consider the implications of our findings so far for engaging different types of 
stakeholders, in particular lay stakeholders, in defining monitoring objectives and 
strategies, and offer five observations.  
 
First, monitoring is not an end in itself but part of a bigger story: it is intended to 
support implementation of geological disposal but this may entail it being put to quite 
different uses. Second, the way in which people view monitoring and what they expect 
to obtain from it differs according to (among other things) their attitudes towards 
geological disposal and the basis for long-term safety. Monitoring could therefore be 
part of the answer to the societal expectation that in order to ensure safety vigilance 
should be maintained. Third, this does not mean however that such issues need to be 
settled now and fixed for the duration of the disposal process. What seems important is 
that monitoring programmes are designed so that they remain flexible enough to 
respond to changing social and regulatory expectations. Fourth, the process of 
monitoring should be transparent and open to public and expert scrutiny. This will have 
to be built into the institutional context through which roles and responsibilities for 
long-term radioactive waste management are organised. Finally, we conclude from our 
research to date that a more fully socialised concept of trust is central to understanding 
the extent to which monitoring may contribute to building confidence in geological 
disposal.  
 
In conclusion we suggest that monitoring programmes in the context of radioactive 
waste management may well be able to contribute to public and stakeholder confidence, 
but that this requires that we recognize monitoring as a socio-technical activity that will 
involve the pursuit of social and institutional innovations as much as technical and 
industrial innovation. 
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1   Introduction 
This report is the product of research activity within the EC Seventh Framework 
Programme “Monitoring Developments for Safe Repository Operation and Staged 
Closure” (MoDeRn) Project. This project aims to further develop the understanding of 
the role of monitoring in staged implementation of geological disposal to a level of 
description that is closer to the actual implementation of monitoring. 
 
MoDeRn’s view on monitoring is that it provides operators and other stakeholders with 
in-situ data on repository evolutions, to help manage construction, operation and/or 
closure activities, and may allow for a comparison with prior safety assessments. The 
project focuses on monitoring conducted to confirm the basis of the long term safety 
case and on monitoring conducted to inform on options available to manage the 
stepwise disposal process from construction to closure (including e.g. the option of 
waste retrieval). It thus provides information to inform necessary decisions. If, in 
addition, monitoring activities respond to stakeholder needs and provide them with 
understandable results, they will contribute to transparency and possibly to stakeholder 
confidence in the disposal process. 
 
The project is structured into six work packages (WPs). The first four WPs are dedicated 
to (i) analyse key objectives and propose viable strategies, based on both technical and 
stakeholder considerations; to (ii) establish the state of the art and provide technical 
developments to match specific repository requirements; to (iii) conduct in-situ 
monitoring demonstration experiments using innovative techniques; and to (iv) conduct 
a case study of monitoring and its integration into staged disposal, including specific 
scenario analysis aimed at providing guidance on how to handle and communicate 
monitoring results, in particular when these provide “unexpected” information. The fifth 
WP regroups all dissemination and outreach activities and the sixth WP is dedicated to 
consolidating project results into a reference framework on how monitoring may be 
conducted at the various phases of the disposal process. 
 
This report is to be situated within WP1 and addresses those elements that the authors 
see key when considering options for stakeholder engagement in developing monitoring 
objectives and strategies. 
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1.1 Why this Report? 
The purpose of this report is to provide a basis for potential stakeholder engagement 
activity in relation to monitoring of facilities for geological disposal. 
 
In the presentation of the MoDeRn project, monitoring is affirmed as of central 
importance to the successful implementation of a repository programme for radioactive 
waste. On the one hand, monitoring is seen as an essential practice, or set of practices, 
for confirming the technical safety and engineering quality of any such programme. On 
the other hand, it is asserted to be a vital tool for ‘public communication, contributing to 
public understanding of, and confidence in repository behaviour’ (MoDeRn 2009).  
 
In this report the ambition is to investigate further monitoring as a collection of 
practices of combined technical and social significance in radioactive waste 
management, and to do so from a social science perspective. The advantage of adopting 
a social science perspective, it will be argued, is that this allows for greater appreciation 
of repository monitoring as a field driven as much by social and institutional innovation, 
as technical and industrial innovation. Monitoring can imply a range of different 
activities and arrangements introduced for a range of different purposes. Expectations 
on monitoring will differ between groups in society, and not uncommonly between 
individuals belonging to the same group or organisation. Monitoring, therefore, is not 
solely about the further development and calibration of measuring devices confirming 
repository performance. It is also a field where developing safety principles can be 
translated into practical arrangements, leading to their progressive institutionalization. 
Therefore, the setting up of monitoring programmes involves re-evaluating and re-
enacting how safe repository operation and closure should proceed, as well as the 
distribution of roles and responsibilities in the socio-technical decision process. 
 
Therefore, rather than focussing on solely the practical organizational challenges of 
setting up stakeholder engagement with monitoring conceived as an exclusively 
technical activity, this report will promote an appreciation of monitoring as a combined 
socio-technical activity central to the pursuit of safe repository operation and staged 
closure. Key issues to be addressed in this report from a combined socio-technical 
perspective are: What is the underlying logic and rationale for the monitoring of a 
geological disposal facility? What meaning is ascribed to the monitoring of geological 
disposal by different actors, and in particular expert stakeholders? At what stages of 
repository development is monitoring considered most relevant and indispensable, and 
how is it planned to implement programmes? What are the limits of monitoring activity? 
How can monitoring as an activity dedicated to producing new forms of visibility be 
reconciled with the principle of passive safety informing geological disposal and the 
total isolation of radioactive waste from the biosphere?   
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This report represents the authors’ reflections on repository monitoring and the role 
envisioned for it in radioactive waste management, based on their participation in the 
MoDeRn project and through their interaction with technical experts in this emerging 
field. It describes points of interest and discussion identified by the authors that could 
form the basis for meaningful interaction between experts and a broader range of 
interested parties and stakeholders on monitoring issues.  
 
Given the stage of development of geological disposal programmes in most countries 
participating in the MoDeRn project, the focus of this report is primarily on the potential 
for engagement with (lay) stakeholders in the earlier stages of repository development 
(i.e. before actual construction and operation of a facility) and the integration of 
monitoring activities into the repository concept. However, due attention will also be 
given to the role of different concerned actors in monitoring throughout the repository 
development and closure process.  
1.2 Basis for this Report 
This report draws on two forms of source material, the first being empirical data from a 
variety of sources and the second being relevant research literature on public and 
stakeholder relationships to monitoring, particularly in the context of nuclear facilities.  
The data that has been collected (between September 2009 and November 2011) and 
analysed includes: 
- Recordings of interviews with experts (mainly technical specialists) associated 
with the MoDeRn consortium; 
- Observational and recorded data collected through participation in project and 
other workshops on geological repository monitoring or related issues; 
- Technical documents including internal project reports and reports by other 
bodies; 
- Documents that record stakeholder views on repository monitoring and related 
issues. 
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with a number of MoDeRn consortium 
members and some of their technical colleagues. Between January and July 2010 in all 
18 representatives of waste management agencies or their technical partners were 
interviewed. The majority of these were technical experts, most focussing on the issue of 
monitoring within their organisation. Three respondents had a social sciences or 
communications background and particular expertise with questions of stakeholder 
engagement. The open, semi-structured interviews focussed on: the respondents 
personal views on monitoring objectives; on what they assumed other stakeholders’ 
views and how to incorporate them; on how to communicate about monitoring results; 
on how to handle unexpected results; on their views on post-closure monitoring; on 
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their personal experience with lay stakeholder involvement and expectations from lay 
stakeholder involvement for developing a monitoring programme. All interviews were 
recorded and transcribed. In Section 2 of the report quotations taken from the recorded 
interviews are used to illustrate key findings. Names of sources are not reported for 
reasons of privacy, nor is their affiliation, unless this was considered relevant to 
understand the context of the quote in question. A list of experts interviewed is 
appended to this report.  
1.3 Structure of the Report 
In Section 2 the report examines the different meanings that are given to monitoring in 
the context of the geological disposal of radioactive waste and considers where, in that 
respect, the focus of the MoDeRn project lies. It summarises the views and 
interpretations on the subject offered by experts and found in technical documents, 
including understandings of the purpose and design of monitoring programmes, and of 
the process of putting them into practice. In addition, expert perceptions of stakeholder 
concerns and their expectations of broader stakeholder engagement activities dealing 
with monitoring are discussed. In Section 3 what is known from published sources about 
citizen and stakeholder concerns and expectations of repository monitoring is reviewed. 
Given the relatively limited incidence of such monitoring, citizen involvement in other, 
more or less comparable, forms of monitoring is also reviewed. In Section 4 the material 
presented in the two earlier sections is compared and analysed from a social science 
perspective, paying attention to the inherent dual nature of monitoring as a combined 
technical and social activity, and considering how monitoring in relation to geological 
disposal could be perceived and approached from the perspective of non-technical 
stakeholders, including affected citizens. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude by discussing 
and summarizing the practical implications of addressing monitoring as a combined 
socio-technical activity.  
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2   Expert Views on Monitoring 
In this section we take a closer look at what technical specialists in the field consider to 
be the role of monitoring in relation to the geological disposal of radioactive waste. We 
look at expert definitions of monitoring and the purposes assigned to it; the different 
approaches and types of monitoring being proposed and developed, as well as the needs 
and opportunities identified by experts for bringing in different stakeholder 
perspectives to help shape monitoring strategies. 
 
Throughout this section of the report, we attempt to ‘follow the actors’ (in this case the 
technical expert community) so as to try and understand their thinking and give 
meaning to their actions. We will not analyse monitoring strategies as ready-made 
entities, but rather attempt to follow the reasoning of ‘the best of all guides - scientists 
and engineers themselves’ (Latour 1987) along the paths they are currently taking to 
build these strategies. We shall do this by referring to strategic and technical documents 
on monitoring produced by national agencies or international organisations or in 
project settings; to interviews with experts from different waste management agencies 
represented in the MoDeRn consortium; as well as to observations from workshops 
organised by the MoDeRn consortium or others in relation to the subject of monitoring 
for geological disposal. Cultivating the perspective of the curious outsider we shall 
reflect over and attempt to summarize what we have learnt from following the experts.  
 
The structural integration of monitoring activities in the geological disposal process 
appears to have become more widespread over the last decade. The report of a 
European Thematic Network on this subject offers three reasons for this (EC 2004). 
First, geological disposal itself has only within that same timeframe evolved from a 
paper and laboratory concept to a more concrete and implementable project, and still 
only realistically in a handful of countries. Secondly, as national programmes develop 
towards more detailed site investigations and implementation, the stepwise nature of 
implementation, entailing a sequence of stages, has become more apparent, as has the 
‘need for well-founded decision bases and evidence (to which monitoring will 
contribute)’. Furthermore, with projects becoming more concrete and more visible to 
the public and to potentially affected populations, issues of (public) confidence have 
come to the fore (NEA 1999). This has given rise to a need to verify and confirm 
repository performance by monitoring repository processes in order to enable future 
decision-makers to judge at each stage the appropriateness of taking the next step in 
implementation, right up to final closure of a facility. 
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In the meantime, defining and carrying out a monitoring strategy has been listed as a 
Safety Requirement1 for the geological disposal of radioactive waste by the IAEA in 
2006. With these safety requirements, the IAEA wishes to set ‘protection objectives and 
criteria for geological disposal’ and to establish ‘the requirements to ensure the 
radiological safety … during the operational period and especially in the post-closure 
period’ (IAEA 2006). Operational controls, monitoring and testing are seen as essential 
for assuring operational safety. They are seen as contributing to the further 
development of the post-closure aspects of the safety case during the period the 
repository remains operational, and are considered to provide baseline information for 
taking decisions on the closure of the facility. However, it is stressed that ‘safety is 
ensured by passive means inherent in the characteristics of the site and the facility and 
those of the waste packages’ (IAEA 2006: 4). Monitoring and institutional controls are 
therefore not considered a requirement to ensure post-closure safety. Nevertheless, a 
potential role in providing assurance is recognised for post-closure monitoring and 
institutional controls, particularly in relation to maintaining nuclear safeguards and to 
measures contributing to ‘social acceptability’ (IAEA 2006). 
 
Although monitoring had been referred to in several documents before, with the 
presentation of these safety requirements, monitoring is explicitly recognised by the 
IAEA as playing an integral part in assuring the safety of a geological repository. In this 
respect, three specific requirements concerning monitoring programmes have been 
formulated by the IAEA: 
“A programme of monitoring shall be defined and carried out prior to and during the construction and 
operation of a geological disposal facility. This programme shall be designed to collect and update the 
information needed to confirm the conditions necessary for the safety of workers and members of the public 
and the protection of the environment during the operation of the facility, and to confirm the absence of any 
conditions that could reduce the post-closure safety of the facility.”  
“Monitoring is carried out during each step of the development and operation of the geological disposal 
facility. The purposes of the monitoring programme include providing baseline information for subsequent 
assessments, assurance of operational safety and operability of the facility, and confirmation that 
conditions are consistent with post-closure safety. Monitoring programmes are designed and implemented 
so as not to reduce the overall level of post-closure safety of the facility.” 
“Plans for monitoring with the aim of providing assurance of post-closure safety are drawn up before 
construction of the geological disposal facility to indicate possible monitoring strategies, but remain 
flexible and, if necessary, will be revised and updated during the development and operation of the 
facility.” (IAEA 2006: 31-32) 
 
                                                        
1
 Safety Requirements are to be situated in between Safety Fundamentals, which set out broad objectives, 
concepts and principles, and Safety Guides, which offer recommendations and guidance on how to operate in 
practice. Safety Requirements are expressed as ‘shall’ statements. Not meeting them means measures will need 
to be taken to restore the required safety level (IAEA 2010). 
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This strengthens the impression that monitoring is here to stay and will need to be 
treated as an integral part of repository development and design. But an internationally 
recognised requirement or even obligation to monitor does not necessarily imply a 
shared understanding of what monitoring is and how it could and should be conducted, 
even if most of the experts we have encountered wholeheartedly subscribe to one and 
the same definition of monitoring for geological disposal as their point of reference. 
2.1 The Experts’ Reference Definition of Monitoring 
The technical partners in the MoDeRn project consider the work of the European 
Thematic Network (ETN) on the role of monitoring in a phased approach to the 
geological disposal of radioactive waste (2001 - 2004)2 as their point of reference. As the 
majority of experts interviewed also referred to the ETN definition of monitoring, we 
will start by looking more closely at this definition and suggested strategies relating to it. 
The ETN did not, however, operate in a void. Around the turn of the century, monitoring 
became a matter of concern, first in the world of implementers and waste management 
agencies, and soon after also among regulators and safety authorities. With plans 
becoming more concrete in different countries, the need to consider monitoring 
strategies and other forms of control became ever more apparent and frameworks were 
being explored for developing common understandings and goals, and setting 
international standards in this field.  
 
Prior to the setting up of the ETN, work had been initiated on monitoring. The IAEA’s 
Waste Technology Section for example had set itself the task of preparing a report in its 
TECDOC series3 dedicated to the issue of monitoring for geological disposal. TECDOC-
1208, issued in 2001, was based on a number of meetings held between December 1996 
and February 2000, bringing together several technical experts, mainly from waste 
management agencies across the world.  
 
Although monitoring of geological repositories had been referred to in earlier IAEA 
documents (e.g. IAEA, 1989; 1991), the first explicit definition of monitoring for 
geological disposal can be found in TECDOC-1208. Here monitoring, is defined as:  
“continuous or periodic observations and measurements of engineering, environmental or radiological 
parameters, to help evaluate the behaviour of components of the repository system, or the impacts of the 
repository and its operation on the environment.” (IAEA 2001: 1). 
 
                                                        
2
 Participants from 10 countries were involved, namely: Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, 
The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. 
3
 The IAEA Technical Documents (IAEA-TECDOC) report on various aspects of the Agency's work. They do 
not aim to set standards or guidelines, but are intended to contribute to on-going debate on specific topics. 
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Later the ETN extended the IAEA definition to encompass potentially any parameter 
deemed important to investigate, emphasising the role of monitoring in support of 
decision-making. Monitoring is thus defined as:  
“continuous or periodic observations and measurements of engineering, environmental, radiological or 
other parameters and indicators/characteristics, to help evaluate the behaviour of components of the 
repository system, or the impacts of the repository and its operation on the environment, and to help in 
making decisions on the implementation of successive phases of the disposal concept.” (EC 2004: 10). 
 
So in short, monitoring is about collecting information on the repository system, 
ultimately to support decision-making. More specifically, it is about observing through 
measurements the behaviour and impact of the repository system. It is about assisting 
in making visible what otherwise, without the proper instrumentation and evaluation 
models to interpret the obtained data, would remain invisible. 
 
Both definitions above can be read in relation to more general definitions of monitoring, 
as for example provided in the Oxford English Dictionary, where ‘to monitor’ is defined 
as:  
“to check or regulate the technical quality of something without causing any interruption or disturbance; 
… to observe, supervise, or keep under review; to keep under observation; to measure or test at intervals, 
esp. for the purpose of regulation or control.” (http://dictionary.oed.com/).  
 
From an outsider’s perspective this seems reassuring, as it indicates that irregularities 
and unexpected events could be communicated to a lay audience. The ETN definition 
appears to explicitly suggest a three step process of (i) observing, (ii) making visible, 
and (iii) deciding. 
 
However, the question remains how the expert community views the practical 
implementation of monitoring and whether this will be able to meet the expectations of 
other stakeholders. In the following paragraphs we will explore the commonalities and 
discrepancies that exist in technical expert representations of monitoring. The relation 
to stakeholder expectations, which will be explored in Section 3, will be further 
examined in Section 4. 
2.2 Decision-Making and Confidence Building as Determinants of Monitoring 
In both the IAEA TECDOC-1208 (IAEA 2001) and the ETN report (EC 2004) multiple 
reasons are given for why a geological disposal facility should be monitored. At second 
glance and with reference to what we have learned from interviews and discussions 
with MoDeRn consortium members, it appears appropriate to conclude that monitoring 
is about seeking confirmation that the facility performs as required and that the 
basic safety assumptions were correct. In this respect, the diversity of reasons given 
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in the two basic reference documents can actually be subsumed under two broader 
categories – taking into account that both are, to a large extend intertwined: 
1) monitoring to support decision-making, and 
2) monitoring to provide (re)assurance. 
 
A similar interpretation of the core reasons for monitoring is provided by ONDRAF/NIRAS 
when setting out its overarching strategy for the development of a testing and 
monitoring program for the Belgian geological disposal program:  
“The current and primary objectives of the Belgian long-term testing and monitoring program are to (SNL 
- URS 2009: 6):  
- Confirm long-term repository performance, and  
- Assist in decision-making.”  
 
For our report, we therefore focus on monitoring for purposes of (re)assurance, in 
addition to monitoring for purposes of decision-making, as the concepts of assurance 
and reassurance allow for the incorporation of the notion of performance confirmation, 
as well as of a number of related elements that we have come across in our analysis. 
 
In the following paragraphs we will look more closely into both functions of monitoring. 
 
2.2.1 Monitoring in Support of Decision-Making 
Several of the reasons mentioned in the IAEA TECDOC-1208 [a] and ETN report [b] 
relate, directly or indirectly, to a supporting role for monitoring in decision-making:  
- ‘to support management decisions in view of the staged development of the 
repository programme’ [a],  
- ‘to support societal decision-making on the major stages of the repository 
development programme’ [a],  
- ‘to accumulate an environmental database for future decision-makers’ [a], and  
- ‘to establish baseline conditions’ [b].  
 
Thinking about monitoring and its role in relation to geological disposal is strongly 
related to how a process of repository development is viewed. Even if the whole of the 
radioactive waste management community is dedicated to the eventual closure of any 
constructed geological repository, it is expected that reaching this stage will take at least 
several decades. The decision-making process for long-term radioactive waste 
management, including the development and implementation of a geological repository 
- as the final endpoint in the long-term management of particularly high-level waste and 
spent fuel - is generally recognised as demanding a stepwise approach (see e.g. NEA 
2004a; NAS 2003). In such a stepwise progression towards the final goal of closure, 
monitoring is considered by experts to play an important role: 
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 “In itself, monitoring is not indispensable for the safe operation of a repository, but it nevertheless has a 
specific role to play.” (Respondent 5) 
“… this fits with the recommendations of the NEA concerning progressive transition towards passive 
safety. We cannot let this transition happen abruptly. It has to happen progressively, and be demonstrated 
while doing.” (Respondent 9) 
“The whole system is conceived to rely on passive safety. Monitoring has to help us prepare and make that 
transition from active to passive” (Respondent 8) 
“Monitoring is of particular importance in relation to progressive closure. To be able to decide to start 
closing a facility, one has to have at one’s disposal the necessary measurements to take that decision. 
Monitoring is therefore a fundamental decision-making tool: both for the decision to close, as for the 
possibility to reopen. This works two ways. I don’t think we will proceed towards closure if measurements 
would show any kind of anomalies.” (Respondent 4) 
 
The perceived role of monitoring as an aid to decision-making can be derived from the 
above quotes. Both in view of operational and management decisions (e.g. adopting a 
new technique for waste emplacement after several years of operation), as well as with 
regard to decisions concerning major steps in the process (e.g. decisions to start 
operations or to close the facility): the role of monitoring is to support decisions 
‘concerning the evolution and future development of the repository facility’ (Respondent 
6) and to provide both the implementer, the regulator and society at large with the 
confidence that a decision to close the facility can be taken. Monitoring plays this 
supportive role by ‘verifying that the safety requirements are met, both during 
operations and in the long term’ (Respondent 2). 
 
This last distinction between operational safety and long-term safety is the key to 
understanding where the main challenges lie for developing monitoring strategies for 
geological disposal. We will come back to this in the following sections. 
 
Obviously, there is a strong link between the role of monitoring in supporting decision-
making and the second role experts attribute to it in providing (re)assurance. This 
second role, as we will demonstrate in the following paragraphs, however, goes further 
than supporting decisions and is, in this respect, even more fundamental. 
 
2.2.2 Monitoring for (Re)assurance 
Although not always easy to distinguish from decision-making, other reasons mentioned 
in the IAEA TECDOC-1208 [a] and ETN report [b] place emphasis on monitoring as a 
means to provide assurance, or reassurance that the facility performs as required:  
- ‘to check and ensure the safe operation of the repository’ [a][b],  
- ‘to strengthen the understanding of system behaviour’ [a], or  
- ‘to confirm key assumptions regarding the safety-related features of the disposal 
system’ [b]. 
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Both documents furthermore stipulate a role for monitoring in addressing the 
requirement of nuclear safeguards. This stipulates the assurance that ‘no unlawful 
retrieval of material from the repository can take place’ (EC 2004).  
 
However, only once during our interviews was the issue of nuclear safeguards 
spontaneously raised by a respondent, and even then not as an immediate reason for 
monitoring. Only when explicitly asked, did others comment on the possible relationship 
between monitoring and nuclear safeguards. This may to some extent reflect the very 
specific focus of the research being carried out by many of our respondents. However, 
the view of some seemed to be that, because of the technical difficulties of retrieving 
waste from a closed deep geological facility and the unsuitability of the materials for 
weapon production, illegal recovery of waste for such purposes in the post-closure 
period was an improbable scenario, but that monitoring against such an eventuality 
could be achieved by satellite surveillance (see also EC 2004: 11): 
“ Anyone who is a nuclear engineer or a physicist will tell you that making atomic weapons out of spent 
nuclear fuel is such a nonsense, no sensible person on earth would do that.” (Respondent 10) 
“From the moment everything is sealed off, all you need in terms of safeguards is some camera 
surveillance; and even that is frankly not necessary. Who would want to amuse himself by digging a hole 
several hundred meters deep in the ground before even reaching the waste? Such things will hardly go 
unnoticed.” (Respondent 2) 
 
The issue of (re)assurance or confidence building on the other hand was explicitly and 
repeatedly mentioned by all respondents as one of the main drivers for monitoring: 
“The biggest challenge is that we talk about projects extending over a period of several decades. It is 
therefore only logical that you apply monitoring to make sure your system performs as required; and this to 
give both lay people and experts the confidence that the repository is well managed. With respect to the 
safety authorities, monitoring can confirm for them that the licence they issued was rightfully granted and 
that all activity is in compliance with the conditions set in that licence.” (Respondent 7) 
 
As is clearly expressed in the above quote, our respondents did not consider the role of 
monitoring in providing reassurance as limited to public confidence building. The 
primary motivation of monitoring for them is that it allows for self-assurance and of 
demonstration to the regulator that all is well and will most likely remain so. So let’s 
have a closer look at this threefold role of monitoring to provide reassurance. 
 
2.2.2.1 Monitoring as a means of assurance for the designer, modeller, implementer 
“Before we used to think: ‘Monitoring is something to convince others’. Now we think we should broaden 
the scope, so that it is also useful to us. Monitoring is necessary to confirm your design.” (Respondent 8) 
“We think we know enough and that we are sure of ourselves, but it’s always better to verify that. … We 
are talking here about an installation that is unique, and in that sense it is necessary to take monitoring one 
step further. This is what is behind our notion of monitoring. We may have a passive system in mind, but we 
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do not have any real experience with that. So the best thing to do, is to observe as much as possible and to 
understand what happens down there.” (Respondent 3) 
 
Monitoring was viewed by many of the experts interviewed as an important verification 
tool. Two closely related but distinct aspects were referred to: verifying the repository 
system; and verifying the modelling behind it.  
 
Performance confirmation, interpreted here in the broadest sense as checking if the 
repository behaves as it should, thus confirming that prior decisions were sound and 
that the basis for passive safety is adequate, was seen as one of the most important 
monitoring objectives: 
“Monitoring is the whole system of verification and control, of measuring, which indicates if the repository 
system behaves as anticipated.” (Respondent 2) 
“For me, monitoring is the following up over a period of several decades (throughout the operational 
period) the evolution of the physical and chemical processes that occur in the repository and to verify if 
these are consistent with what our models predicted.” (Respondent 3) 
 
A similar interpretation is to be found in IAEA TECDOC-1566 addressing factors 
believed to affect public and political acceptance of geological disposal. When 
considering monitoring, it is argued that: 
“Particularly in a first-of-a-kind undertaking, it is impossible to rule out miscalculations in the projections 
of repository performance. It may be prudent to establish means to identify this type of error.” (IAEA 
2007: 12) 
 
In addition, many of the experts interviewed also referred to monitoring as essential in 
confirming that the basis of the scientific models on which their safety cases are build, is 
correct. Rather than on the behaviour of the repository itself, the emphasis is here put 
on the soundness of the models predicting repository behaviour, both in the (relatively) 
short term of repository operations and in view of long-term repository performance, 
that is after closure of the facility. 
“Monitoring is a tool to verify from a technical perspective if the engineers’ models and predictions are 
indeed correct, or need to be improved.” (Respondent 5) 
“The purpose of monitoring is performance confirmation to demonstrate that the models and predictions 
that we took as a starting point actually correspond with reality.” (Respondent 9) 
“Meanwhile we are able to calculate and predict the behaviour [of mining structures], but we have some 
uncertainties in it and for that reason … we use monitoring in the operational phase of the mining 
structures to improve our models.” (Respondent 12) 
 
This particular role of monitoring was also explicitly referred to by the ETN: 
“Monitoring data will be used in scientific models of repository performance, partly to provide input data, 
partly to assess the performance of the models in predicting monitoring observations and partly to allow 
the models to be updated and refined. In this manner the scientific models of the site and of the repository 
can be validated, adapted and refined or rejected.” (EC 2004:26) 
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When putting forward monitoring as a means of reassuring the experts themselves, the 
emphasis is clearly on monitoring during the phase of construction and operation. 
During this period, there is still (some) flexibility to refine the models that are used to 
predict system performance and long-term safety. Furthermore, it is argued, it would 
still be relatively easy to take action if monitoring results were to lead to more drastic 
intervention (e.g. package retrieval). So within that period, the objective would be to 
monitor for operational safety, for environmental impact assessment, for nuclear 
safeguards, and for long-term safety assessments. Given this there would appear to be a 
general consensus and clarity of purpose among experts. 
 
Post-closure monitoring, however, is not seen by these experts as adding anything to 
the scientific case that will already have been made for the long-term safety of the 
repository, without which closure would not have been consented. :  
“From a purely technical point of view, there are few needs for monitoring the environment of a closed 
geological repository, as there will not be anything to measure. … Post-closure monitoring in terms of 
making sure nothing goes wrong is pointless and contributes to a negative image.” (Respondent 1)  
“What action would you take after closure, knowing this would imply substantially greater difficulty of first 
(re)accessing the repository?” (Respondent 7) 
This concern, that rather than providing reassurance post-closure monitoring might 
lead stakeholders to interpret it as evidence of scientific uncertainty and perceptions 
that the repository was not safe, has been fairly common among technical experts 
although it has now been accepted that it may have a positive effect  
 
Post-closure monitoring of an underground repository itself – so in situ monitoring – is 
furthermore seen by many as unrealistic and even potentially counterproductive: 
 “Well, I think so far, at least the consensus here currently is that there is no post closure performance 
confirmation that all this monitoring is during the operational phase, not post closure to make it technically 
reasonable. One thing we want to be prepared for is if somebody requests a post closure performance 
confirmation of a cell that’s 500 metres down in the ground, inaccessible and so on. That we say is 
technically unrealistic and it doesn’t serve a purpose because the evolutions, physical evolutions are 
virtually identical if we just put a seal in front of that thing and for the first one thousand years you don’t 
see a difference. If you see what I mean”.  (Participant B at Madrid workshop discussion)  
“Disposal is not something that’s supposed to be monitored over the long term. You can monitor and prove 
that it has been implemented successfully, according to certain criteria, there are quality considerations, 
but to do it post-closure to the time that canisters fail and material starts to come out is just, you know, it’s 
just inconceivable.” (Respondent 14) 
 
The main reason for this sceptical attitude, is that experts are certain that monitoring 
given the long time frame of the system’s evolution – ‘we are talking here about 
canisters that are designed not to be breached for thousands of years’ (Respondent 14) – 
will not be able to provide confirmation of those factors that provide long term safety, as 
one will only be able to measure only very few parameters for a very short time. 
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Furthermore it is argued that ‘it would not be realistic to expect monitoring 
programmes to be sustained for such long periods of time’ (Respondent 18). 
 
Nevertheless, many people interviewed think there may be a value in post-closure 
monitoring, even if it is mainly to reassure other actors such as neighbours (see Section 
2.2.2.3), but, as with all monitoring of the repository system, only insofar as it would not 
be intrusive.  
“In [my country] ... we have to monitor every mine some decades after closure. And I kind of understand 
the people who say: okay if you have a mine you have to monitor it and a repository is a mine too … So for 
mining reasons we monitor it, but not for radiological safety reasons. That would not seem very 
transparent. And then I say: okay, if you have to monitor anyway, then you put just one more sensor in the 
shafts and look whether there is radioactivity in the ground water or something like that.” (Respondent 12) 
“In our main facility, intrusive monitoring will not be allowed (certainly not near the waste). In fact it is 
not so much about the wires being there, but about that taking the wires out at some point may not affect 
repository safety. That is why we need to look at what will happen for example if we put a glass fibre 
through a seal. Can we retrieve that later?” (Respondent 13)  
“Monitoring will start during the operational life of the facility and then outside of the barrier system, in 
my opinion, it should be continued [after closure] … But outside of the barriers, not to affect the repository 
safety. … They always say: ‘Yeah okay there will be nothing during that time’ but you just have to show 
that there is nothing. And for that reason you must monitor it, but that also means measuring the 
background radioactivity on the sampling points at the earliest of times.” (Respondent 12) 
 
This position was also found in technical opinion documents: 
“Post closure monitoring may be carried out for the purpose of accumulating an environmental data base 
on the repository site and its surroundings that may be of use to future decision makers.” … 
“Post closure monitoring may be used to strengthen understanding of some aspects of system behaviour 
used in developing the safety case for the repository and to allow further testing of models predicting those 
aspects.” (IAEA 2002: 10)4 
 
The key element for experts as regards post-closure monitoring is that ‘it should not be 
done within or inside the very barriers that ensure safety’ and that ‘monitoring [i.e. 
taking measurements] alone, and in particular in situ repository monitoring, does not 
suffice to judge long-term repository behaviour’ (Respondent 14). Other elements from 
other sources, such as experiments, models, or natural analogues should also be 
considered (Harvey and White 2011). 
 
                                                        
4
 Conclusions from a specialists meeting held in Vienna, 18-22 June 2001, considering issues relating to safety 
standards for geological disposal. One session was dedicated entirely to (post-closure) monitoring and 
institutional control. 
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2.2.2.2 Monitoring to assure the regulator 
Other than to acquire assurance or confirmation of repository performance and the 
basis for the models that support the safety case, monitoring is also seen as instrumental 
in showing compliance with legal and regulatory requirements.  
“… monitoring would also be carried out …: 
(1) to determine any radiological impacts of the operational disposal system (as with a nuclear installation, 
like a power plant) on the personnel and on the general population, in order to comply with statutory and 
regulatory requirements; 
(2) to determine non-radiological impacts on the environment surrounding the repository, to comply with 
environmental regulatory requirements (e.g. impacts of excavation and surface construction on local 
water supply rates and water quality); 
(3) to ensure compliance with non-nuclear industrial safety requirements for an underground facility 
(e.g. dust, gas, noise, etc.).” (IAEA 2001: 3) 
 
By doing this, the implementer demonstrates to the outside world that he has his 
repository under control. A crucial actor in judging whether monitoring results indeed 
corroborate such claims is the regulator. 
 “The reason for compliance monitoring during each of the stages of repository development is to provide 
proof that the implementation of the disposal concept is complying with the standards and criteria set by 
the applicable regulations and site licence. Compliance will in turn give assurance that these criteria for 
repository behaviour will continue to be met.” (EC 2004: 21)  
 “I think it is clear that the monitoring system would be designed according to what the regulator says.” 
(Participant A at Madrid workshop discussion) 
“The test is that the regulator is satisfied with it as one criterion that indicates the implementer is doing a 
good job in putting in place the monitoring programme.”  (Participant B at Madrid workshop discussion) 
“Monitoring is a way to show the regulator and others that we have control over our system and are 
capable of acting upon what we observe, including adapting our monitoring programme.” (Respondent 2) 
 
Assuring the regulator is also seen as important because of the intermediate position the 
regulator holds between the implementer and the public: 
“Well, the local stakeholders will not trust the implementer but normally they will trust the regulatory 
authority. So, the important thing is that the design of the specification for the monitoring system is agreed 
with the regulator.” (Participant A at Madrid workshop discussion) 
 
Monitoring for compliance and to assure the regulator was particularly referred to in 
view of monitoring for operational safety and for environmental impact 
assessment, when considering potential consequences of constructing and operating a 
repository facility5. For these aspects, regulatory requirements are generally known 
today, and come from different regulatory authorities, such as mining authorities or 
nuclear safety authorities: 
                                                        
5
 As discussed for example during an internal MoDeRn workshop on monitoring objectives, held in Amsterdam 
on 1 September 2010 at which 10 experts were present. 
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“Where the operational phase is concerned, we are certain that there will be monitoring and that it will be 
necessary to monitor. … Existing regulation obliges us to provide for specific measures (e.g. 
radioprotection, …). This we already know today.” (Respondent 1) 
“Regulatory boundary conditions that we need to take into account when developing our monitoring 
strategy are set by our mining regulations, regulations on radiation protection, workplace related health 
and safety regulations, and so on.” (Respondent 2) 
 
But regulatory requirements for monitoring are also expected to comprise issues of 
monitoring in view of making predictions on long-term (or post-closure) safety: 
“The purposes of the monitoring programme include … confirmation that conditions are consistent with 
post-closure safety.” … “Plans for monitoring with the aim of providing assurance of post-closure safety 
are drawn up before construction …” (IAEA 2006: 32). 
 
More specifically in Finland, the radiation and nuclear safety authority, STUK, has 
recently issued draft guidelines for the planned geological repository, in which, with 
respect to monitoring the issue of long-term safety demonstration is explicitly raised 
and a minimum of objectives are set: 
“During the construction and operation of the disposal facility, an investigation, testing and monitoring 
program shall be executed to ensure the suitability for disposal of the rock to be excavated, to determine 
safety relevant characteristics of the host rock and to ensure long-term performance of barriers. This 
program shall include at least: 
- characterization of the rock volumes intended to be excavated 
- monitoring of rock stresses, movements and deformations in rock surrounding the waste emplacement 
rooms 
- hydrogeological monitoring of rock surrounding the waste emplacement rooms 
- monitoring of groundwater chemistry at the disposal site 
- monitoring of the behaviour of engineered barriers.” 6 
In Switzerland, the Nuclear Energy Act (KEG)7 and resulting Nuclear Energy Ordinance 
(KEV)8 stipulate a monitoring period, set by the authorities, and the construction of a 
pilot section of the disposal facility for the specific purpose of extensive monitoring of all 
components of the facility. This pilot section must fulfil a number of regulatory 
requirements, including the emplacement of a ‘small, but representative quantity of 
waste’ (KEV: Article 66). 
In most countries, furthermore, some form of socio-political or at least regulatory 
decision is anticipated before the step to final closure of the facility will be taken. In 
France for example, it is stated explicitly by law that only a law could authorise the 
closure of a geological repository :  
                                                        
6
 STUK 2010: Draft YVL-guides - D.5 – 510: p.8 (https://ohjeisto.stuk.fi/YVL/D.5-L4.pdf  - free translation 
from Finnish provided by Posiva). 
7
 Kernergiegesetz, vom 21. März  2003 (KEG). 
8
 Kernenergieverordnung vom 10. Dezember 2004 (KEV). 
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“… sa fermeture définitive. Seule une loi peut autoriser celle-ci” (Loi n°2006-739 du 28 juin 2006 de 
programme relative à la gestion durable de matières et déchets radioactifs: Article 12).  
Similarly, the Swiss Nuclear Energy Act gives the Federal Council the authority to decide 
on the closure of the repository: 
“Upon expiry of the monitoring period, the Federal Council shall order the closure of the repository, if the 
permanent protection of human beings and the environment is ensured” (KEG: Article 39§2).  
 
Monitoring in view of predictions of long-term safety is in this respect considered of 
vital importance to support a decision (in one form or other) to close the facility. 
 “Not too long ago they used to think that the safety of an underground repository could be guaranteed in 
such a way that obtaining a licence would be proof in itself that it were feasible. … But thinking has 
evolved, also due to regulation, which is now so that a licence will not be issued once and for all, and that 
at least an extensive debate will have to take place before we could proceed with closing our repository. 
Therefore we need a continuous evaluation of performance throughout the period prior to closure, so that 
we can demonstrate that it works and that a decision to close the facility could actually be taken with 
confidence. So the need to confirm performance will continue and we will have to keep on collecting data.” 
(Respondent 7) 
 
Where post-closure monitoring is concerned, hardly any regulatory requirements in 
the field or radiation protection exist today, and the overall position remains that 
‘geological disposal facilities do not rely on long-term post-closure institutional control 
as a passive safety function’ (IAEA 2006). Several respondents nevertheless indicated to 
expect such recommendations to arise in the not too distant future.  
“Where post-closure monitoring is concerned, we expect future recommendations that will tell us what is 
considered necessary, indispensable, or contrary undesirable.” (Respondent 1) 
“Anything we plan in terms of post-closure monitoring will depend on the conditions set by the regulator 
and by society – by our politicians and local stakeholders. … The position of our regulator today is that we 
should go as far as possible. So they are bound to come up with something, although the what and how of it 
remains unclear today.” (Respondent 2) 
However, the Swiss Nuclear Energy act clearly leaves all options open: 
“After the repository has been closed in accordance with the applicable regulations, the Federal Council 
may stipulate that it must be monitored for a further limited period of time.” (KEG: Article 39§3). 
Furthermore, in some cases, other regulation exists that requires some form of post-
closure monitoring. This is for example the case in Germany, where the Federal mining 
authorities require post-closure monitoring of any kind of mine, including a geological 
repository for radioactive waste: 
“… monitoring of the mining structure is very common and required by the authorities” … “”According to 
our Federal Mining Act we have to monitor the mine. I don’t know exactly how long , but at least for 
several decades [after closure of the mine].” (Respondent 12) 
 
In its 2006 safety requirements for geological disposal, the IAEA too does not rule out 
the possibility and even potential value of post-closure institutional controls. However, 
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more emphasis is put on the lengthy period before closure and the role of monitoring in 
passing on information to future generations to enable them to take decisions. Under the 
header ‘requirements concerning post-closure and institutional controls’ it is stated 
that: 
“Geological disposal facilities are not likely to be closed for several tens of years after operations have 
commenced. Thus, plans drawn up to identify possible controls and the period over which they would be 
applied remain flexible and conceptual in nature. … Arrangements will be made to pass on information 
about the geological disposal facility to future generations to enable them to make any future decisions on 
the geological disposal facility and its safety.” (IAEA 2006: 32-33). 
 
2.2.2.3 Monitoring to reassure the public and build public confidence in a repository 
There appears to be a general consensus within the expert community that monitoring 
has a major role to play in reassuring the public and in building public confidence in the 
repository. Both the IAEA and the ETN listed public confidence building as one of the key 
purposes of monitoring: 
“… to strengthen confidence, for as long as society requires, that the repository is having no undesirable 
impacts on human health and the environment.” (IAEA 2001: 3) 
“… to ensure that future generations will maintain confidence in the adequacy of the disposal system by 
confirming that the repository does not, at any time, pose a threat to the operating personal and the public, 
and the disposal system and the surrounding natural environment evolve as expected.” (EC 2004: 11) 
 
Similar arguments were given by many of our respondents:  
“The purpose of monitoring is to reassure the public and to show that what we do can be monitored and 
will be monitored and that we have confidence in what we are doing” (Respondent 5) 
“Monitoring has an important role: it allows the non-technical stakeholders to build up trust in the 
repository.” (Respondent 13) 
“So they [the public, lay stakeholders, …] rely very much on visualisation or a demonstration that it’s safe, 
and the need would be that through monitoring one could sort of demonstrate with a few monitored 
variables that the repository is behaving in a safe manner. So I think it is the monitoring that is a bridge for 
the non-technicians to transfer technical details.” (Respondent 13) 
 
This anticipation was furthermore confirmed by an external participant at a MoDeRn 
Workshop for Experts Stakeholders (mainly aimed at regulators), held in Oxford in April 
of 2011: 
“Another external participant emphasised the importance of monitoring to lay stakeholders, noting that 
potential volunteer communities in his country had been asking detailed questions about repository 
monitoring well before potential sites for a repository had been identified.” (Harvey and White 2011:19) 
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2.2.3 Monitoring: to Provide Proof or to Make Transparent?  
In 2007 a team of international experts invited by the IAEA to reflect on factors affecting 
public acceptance of geological disposal, listed monitoring as a specific technical 
requirement that could increase general acceptance. 
“Acceptance appears to be increased when specific technical requirements, such as defence-in-depth, 
retrievability, and monitoring, are explicitly incorporated in the regulatory framework.” (IAEA 2007: 40). 
The reason for this is that it is assumed that ‘uncertainty about repository performance 
drives public concerns’, and therefore that ‘considerations highlighting robustness can 
mitigate those concerns thus increasing public acceptance’ (IAEA 2007: 41). Following 
this line of reasoning, monitoring can help to demonstrate to the outside world that the 
experts know what they are doing and that geological disposal is indeed a safe option to 
manage the waste for several millennia. The question is whether that in itself would be 
sufficient.  
 
During a MoDeRn workshop discussion in Madrid (October 2009) the argument was 
raised that in countries where repository plans become more concrete, local public 
stakeholders do seem to become more interested in monitoring, but that this does not 
necessarily imply greater acceptability: 
“… monitoring is an issue they get more and more interested in.… but I’m not sure it has yet contributed to 
enhanced acceptability. Rather what I have detected is first use by stakeholders of the issue of monitoring 
to find the next Achilles heel in the repository process.” (Participant B at Madrid workshop discussion) 
The same technical specialist was nevertheless convinced that the greatest advantage of 
monitoring in view of public confidence building, is the promise of transparency it 
brings: 
“monitoring is a very powerful tool I think towards transparency … I can see the direct link, for you can 
say: ‘I want to have real data for example to show me whether there is radionuclide contamination of the 
environment or not. Okay, the process to me is transparent because I get continued verification that that’s 
the case.’ … So, there’s a direct link between transparency and monitoring, contributing to listing a few 
objectives I might be interested in and then looking at the results of monitoring.” (Participant B at Madrid 
workshop discussion) 
The distinction made here is interesting, as it moves the focus from the product of 
monitoring to the process of monitoring. It could indeed be argued that it is not so much 
(or not only) the figures you produce to corroborate your claims and models that can 
support confidence building; but it is the fact that you produce them in such a way that 
others will have access to them, are able to control how they came about and will be able 
to give them meaning. From this perspective, it becomes important to know what 
expectations other interested parties may have of a monitoring programme, so that 
measurements can be made that relate to issues of their concern. 
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2.2.4 Experts’ Perceptions of Public and Stakeholder Views on Monitoring 
Most respondents admitted though that they had not as yet explicitly discussed 
monitoring strategies with local stakeholders or other members of the (concerned) 
public.  
“It is true that thus far we have not considered making an analysis of the messages from society and what 
exactly could be the socio-political driving forces behind the question for monitoring.” (Respondent 5) 
“… of course the siting has to mature a bit more, such that one has then a more specific plan of a few 
number of sites and the surface locations where we can really define the project such that one can talk 
about the technical details of the repository and perhaps also of the monitoring. So I think that … these 
questions of monitoring would come up already next year, but that would be quite general, because the 
whole project of the repository wouldn’t be matured enough to go into the detailed questions at that point 
in time.” (Respondent 13) 
 “My personal feeling is that from public hearings and discussing with people in for example church 
groups, or youth groups, … that in the past we did not listen enough to these kind of people, to their 
expectations. … We have discussed especially this topic [i.e. monitoring] and they are always wondering 
why we do not have a plan for monitoring and how to inform them of what is going on.” (Respondent 11) 
This we also saw reflected in the Monitoring Contexts Report, where the evidence 
provided in the national context appendices suggested that relatively few countries have 
engaged with lay stakeholders specifically on the subject of monitoring (MoDeRn 2011). 
Many experts therefore found it difficult to anticipate what lay stakeholder expectations 
as regards to monitoring might be and whether they will be feasible to address. 
 
Still some deduced from other interactions (e.g. the construction and operation of the 
URL in Bure) that the main concern of local stakeholders lies with the potential impact 
of the repository on the environment. The assumption is therefore that local and public 
stakeholders will mainly be interested in environmental monitoring, and not so much 
in near field monitoring. 
“For developing our monitoring programme, we did not go through a stakeholder consultation. We sense 
though that this is something that preoccupies them and that they see monitoring as important. However we 
did not investigate explicitly what their priorities were. Something we do know, is that local people are 
concerned about landslips. That is an issue that has been raised on many occasions. But never specific 
expectations regarding the follow up of the repository, or the waste in itself. Local people’s concern goes 
first and foremost to effects on the surface, impact on topography, etc.” (Respondent 3) 
“In contacts with local stakeholders the emphasis is always strongly on the environment and surroundings, 
far less on the repository itself. For the moment, we do not have the impression that they foster explicit 
expectations regarding the follow up of the installation or the waste.” (Respondent 3) 
 
From high-level technical documents, one could conclude that it is generally assumed 
that local stakeholders and the public will be particularly concerned with post-closure 
monitoring: 
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“In practice, institutional controls, including restrictions on land use, may be maintained even after the 
geological disposal has been closed. Such controls and monitoring are not necessary to ensure the safety of 
the facility; however, they may be regarded as additional measures for assurance.” (IAEA 2006: 18) 
“… continuing monitoring is likely to be a societal demand for some time after repository closure. Such 
monitoring, besides showing that the process of decommissioning surface facilities has been successfully 
completed, would also strengthen the confidence, at least in some sectors of society, that the evolution of 
the waste isolation system is in accordance with expectations.” (IAEA 2001: 1) 
This view we also heard echoed in several interviews: 
“When retrievability is excluded, the main purpose of post-closure monitoring could be to give people 
reassurance and to build confidence.” (Respondent 1) 
 
However, when considering their own national contexts, many experts we spoke to 
place monitoring concerns from local stakeholders and the public in relation to 
reversibility and/or retrievability, and the possibility to intervene in case the repository 
system does not perform as expected. Arguably, this is more related to operational 
management before final closure of the repository: 
“Last year we received some very specific questions [from local stakeholders]. All those that had to do with 
monitoring were directly related to the notion of reversibility. … Actually, those weren’t exactly questions; 
more recommendations that we should continuously keep on monitoring. … What they [i.e. local 
stakeholders] expect from us, is that we will permanently be ‘on watch’ and keep taking measurements” 
(Respondent 3) 
“You begin to get the feeling that people want to stretch the active phase as long as possible. As such, that 
is not too much of a problem, as long as you know the installation is there and you have the means and 
possibility to make sure no activity bearing negative impacts will occur. But you nevertheless need to 
prepare for the passive phase … Here monitoring could help, to demonstrate to people that we can move 
towards a passive system” (Respondent 8) 
 
Based on the impressions of lay-stakeholder concerns that our interviewees expressed, 
it seems that there is a widely held perception that public and stakeholder expectations 
as regards to monitoring are strongly related to environmental impact, both in terms of 
the operational management of the facility and of long-term post-closure safety.  
 
Whether or not local stakeholders or other members of the public in that respect hold 
strong opinions on actual monitoring strategies during construction and operation, or 
hold particular expectations as regards to post-closure monitoring, the accumulated 
experience of agencies in many countries tells us that people will be expecting openness 
and transparency about what is going on in the repository and how this may or may not 
affect the surrounding environment. In this respect, some respondents remarked that 
monitoring is not just about collecting data (and what measurements to make), but also 
about interpreting them and validating this interpretation, both within the expert 
community and within society at large: 
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“Monitoring is not only about putting in place the appropriate instrumentation, but also about what 
happens next: about the analyses and interpretation of results, about the (potentially endless) polemics that 
will follow on the reliability of the data.” (Respondent 5) 
“I’m convinced that one day we will be able to put in place reliable monitoring instruments, but the 
analyses and interpretation of results will to a large degree always remain socio-political.” (Respondent 6) 
 
So in order for monitoring to serve as an effective means of reassuring the public and 
contributing to building public confidence in the repository, both the product and 
process of monitoring will have to meet not only technical expert and regulatory 
objectives and requirements, but also public stakeholders’ potentially diverse 
expectations. 
 
Stakeholder expectations are the focus of Section 3 of this report but before turning our 
attention to that issue, we conclude this section by considering the key challenges 
experts see themselves faced with when developing monitoring strategies for geological 
disposal. 
2.3 Key Challenges for Developing Monitoring Strategies For Geological 
Disposal 
Monitoring for operational safety and regular environmental monitoring (in view of 
classical environmental impact assessment) are considered to be covered by existing 
regulations for nuclear facilities. In terms of technical implementation, experts do not 
see immediate challenges, as existing technologies applied today in other nuclear 
installations, such as interim storage facilities, are considered more than adequate: 
“… monitoring would also be carried out for purely operational reasons during the emplacement of the 
wastes.” … “Techniques and requirements for monitoring in these contexts are well established and tested 
in a wider sense (e.g. as for nuclear installations and mines)…” (IAEA 2001:3) 
“We decided that for the purpose of this project, we would not bring added value by further studying 
nuclear safeguards or operational safety.” (Participant A at Amsterdam workshop discussion) 
 
What experts do see as a major challenge is the issue of monitoring with the aim to 
provide assurance of post-closure safety, or as phrased by the ETN ‘monitoring to 
support evaluations and assessments of repository performance’ (EC 2004). Such 
monitoring would be about verifying if the assumptions on which the repository 
system is based are correct. It is essentially situated in the pre-closure phase, but with 
an eye on future behaviour in a post-closure situation. The need for this kind of 
monitoring has risen more sharply with the (above mentioned) recognition that the 
evolution from an operational to a closed facility will be long (most likely stretching over 
more than one generation) and stepwise or progressive (some elements of the facility 
will be closed sooner than others); and that most likely a series of intermediary 
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milestone decisions, as well as at least one explicit (socio-political) decision will be 
needed before final closure of a facility.  
“During phased development of geological disposal, a series of progressively more detailed assessments of 
the long-term (post-closure) performance of the disposal system and its component subsystems will be 
carried out. These assessments will identify the key features and processes that determine performance and 
safety and, hence, will guide data collection, including guidance as to the collection of monitoring data to 
support future assessment phases. 
The purpose of the monitoring discussed in this section is: 
- To provide information in support of such assessments, in each phase of the system development; 
- To support decisions on when (or how; or indeed, whether) to move on to the next phase.” (EC 
2004:26) 
 
It is in fact the long-term safety component, focussing on what is to be expected after 
closure, which makes monitoring of geological disposal facilities such a specific 
challenge. For it is not just about what you measure - or do not measure - today, but also 
about what this implies - or could imply - for the models you use to predict future 
behaviour. As was described above (see Section 2.2.2.1), with currently envisaged 
techniques the features and processes that contribute to the long-term safety of a 
geological repository can only be monitored directly during the relatively short period 
of operational life of a repository and for a limited period post-closure.9 All one can do is 
monitor to verify the predictive models that form the basis of the long-term safety case 
and, where appropriate, refine them in light of new data. 
 
The necessary monitoring activity would therefore, be more challenging than is the case, 
for example, when monitoring for operational safety or environmental impact 
assessment because the avoidance of intrusion dictates that it will need to make use of 
indirect data. It therefore presents both technical and social challenges as it is, on the 
one hand, about defining measureable parameters based on available technology (as 
well as on anticipated developments in technology) and, on the other hand, about 
meeting - or renegotiating - different stakeholders’ (e.g. implementers, safety 
authorities, neighbours, political decision makers, environmental NGOs, etc.) 
appreciations of what constitutes convincing confirmation of repository performance 
and long-term safety. Furthermore, given the long timescales involved, even if only 
considering the pre-closure period, a reasonable amount of flexibility is considered 
necessary for the monitoring programme to remain useful and effective for as long as it 
is required. 
 
                                                        
9
 Indirect monitoring, of groundwater for example, is of course an available option for as long as it is desired. 
But rather than monitoring repository processes this activity, depending upon on how one views it, either seeks 
to confirm through the absence of evidence to the contrary that these processes continue to conform to 
expectations or seeks evidence in the form of environmental change that they do not.  
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2.3.1 Monitoring for Long-Term Safety as a Techno-Scientific Challenge 
Developing monitoring strategies for assurance of long-term or post-closure safety is 
considered by many of our respondents as still more of a question of R&D, than one of 
engineering and implementation:  
“Anything that has to do with monitoring in the medium or long-term, receptors, etc., is very much 
focussed on the development and use of technology” (Respondent 6) 
 “What we are looking at here is a matter that is outside regular activity. This is about a follow up over 
several decades … with an instrumentation that today has not been developed yet. This is more science 
than pre-engineering or pre-industry. … With monitoring we are still in a phase of development, of thinking 
about how this could be done. So we are still very much at the beginning, at the level of research and 
technical and scientific phrasing of the question.” (Respondent 5) 
“I’m not prepared at this moment to say what exactly one should measure in what facility, how many 
instruments one should have and what one should do with the measurements, exactly how they should be 
used. I think it is not very appropriate for me to comment on those things at this stage. We have to develop 
them.” (Respondent 14)   
 
Two elements are crucial here. The first is that of reconciling a need to collect data about 
repository behaviour with the need to avoid intrusive monitoring techniques that 
potentially could breach seals and compromise the conditions for passive safety. The 
second is the question whether or not there actually is something to measure, directly or 
indirectly, in the relatively short period before closure that would be conclusive enough 
to predict system behaviour with sufficient confidence to be able to exclude a future 
impairment of repository safety. Furthermore, the above statements make clear that a 
programme of performance confirmation includes not only monitoring activity, but also 
a long-term R&D programme that continues to develop monitoring technologies, testing 
and proving them in labs and URLs. 
 
2.3.1.1 Reconciling active monitoring and passive safety 
“The vast majority of organisations [refers here to waste management agencies] are basically saying very 
very little about monitoring and what they’re going to do. And they don’t say what they’re going to do with 
the information. They make statements that are very broad about, you know, “Monitoring should be done, 
but it can’t violate the integrity of the barriers” and then they leave it at that. But they don’t say how you 
would do something that is inherently potentially contradictory.” (Respondent 14) 
 
The above quote sums up nicely one of the biggest challenges monitoring experts are 
faced with today: The fact that some form of (in situ) monitoring will inevitably be 
needed is clearly recognised by most, if not all, implementers and by international 
reference bodies such as the NEA and IAEA. But how to do this without breaching safety 
barriers and thus risking a reduction in the overall level of post-closure safety is a 
question that as yet has not been fully answered.  
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 “Limitations, on the other hand, arise from available monitoring technology; the need to respect all 
technical requirements of a repository monitoring context and in particular the constraints derived from 
the environmental conditions and the fact that monitoring activities must not interfere with the safety 
features and barrier performances of the repository.” (MoDeRn – DOW: 7)  
 
This is why in the MoDeRn project, an important part of the work is dedicated to 
investigating options for non-intrusive monitoring techniques.  
“We have to bring in monitoring without weakening the safety functions. Certainly near the waste, this will 
have to be non-intrusive. You can only have intrusive monitoring, for example by putting a glass fibre 
through a seal, if you can pull it out later, before closing the repository. But the retrieval of wires may 
affect safety. So there are risks involved and you cannot compromise on safety. On the other hand for 
wireless monitoring you need to emplace sensors, and the lifetime of most sensors is only 5 to 10 years. So 
the problems to be solved here are battery lifetime and the possibility of replacement. Through tubes, or 
something, but then you have to go in again. And then there is the problem of transmission.” (Respondent 
15) 
“During the next two years I have to come up with a monitoring concept for a high-level waste repository. 
So they [i.e. the regulator] gave me a large list of questions, for example, which should be answered or I 
should check whether they can be answered or not.  
… a lot of questions concerning near-field monitoring: What about radiation next to the canisters? What 
about chemical evolution of the minerals next to the canisters due to the heat, due to water and so on? …  
How can we monitor engineering barriers for example? How can we monitor, I am just repeating some of 
the questions, how can we monitor fluid migrations in the repository, mainly after closure of the repository, 
so in back filled areas? And one person said we will not be allowed to introduce any cable-bound devices 
in barriers or back filled areas, so we have to come up with new ideas of how to do this with wireless 
systems. And this is very specific and then there are a lot of questions concerning the environmental 
monitoring. What can be done at the surface? Do we have to use geotechnical equipment? Can’t we make 
use of radar systems or satellite-based systems or mainly geophysical systems? Are we able to identify fluid 
movements from the surface in the underground facilities by using geo-electrical techniques or geometrical 
techniques or something like that? Such kind of questions.” (Respondent 11) 
 
During a workshop dedicated especially to monitoring technologies, the MoDeRn 
consortium partners gathered information on wireless sensor networks and wireless 
through-the-earth data transmission, on fibre-optic technologies and geophysical 
techniques, on monitoring of groundwater and chemistry, on geotechnical monitoring, 
as well as on air-based and satellite-based monitoring. The conclusion was that some of 
these techniques indeed look promising and are likely to be of relevance for repository 
monitoring. However, techniques such as wireless data transmission, fibre-optics and 
geophysics, still require quite some further research to adapt them to the specific 
repository monitoring requirements (White et al 2010).  
 
Hence also the firm objection all experts interviewed had to near field monitoring in the 
post-closure phase: 
“Monitoring is something you associate spontaneously with some form of inspection after closure. But in 
the case of geological disposal, this is actually contradictory, as the concept explicitly does not rely on 
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active forms of control and intrusion for the purpose of inspection would be counterproductive.” 
(Respondent 9) 
“What will happen after closure, that will be extremely difficult to measure. The concept is after all 
designed to become passive in the end. The whole safety concept is based on that. Once all operational 
activity is behind us, and the risk of accidents has gone, then the host rock will take over and provide 
protection in case the waste containers fail.” (Respondent 3) 
 
But apart from finding technological solutions for monitoring without interfering with 
the safety barriers (i.e. answers to the question HOW to monitor), there is also 
continuing discussion about what exactly should be measured, which parameters are 
important, and what is feasible (i.e. answers to the question WHAT to monitor): 
“Another problem to solve is the question of parameters: Which parameters do we need to take into 
account? What exactly are we going to measure?” (Respondent 15) 
Rather than seeking definitive answers to these questions for once and for all, they are 
approached in an iterative manner in order to remain open to emerging and future 
possibilities.  
 
2.3.1.2 Short-term monitoring for long-term safety 
Questions of the feasibility and adequacy of monitoring particular parameters in order 
to support the safety case are particularly challenging in view of the extremely long time 
frames that are involved:  
“The biggest uncertainties for us lie extremely far away from us: 10,000 to 100,000s of years; and these 
things we will never be able to measure.” (Respondent 8) 
 
Still most experts seem convinced that there are enough things that can be measured to 
give them a sufficient enough basis to validate (or if need be adjust) the models on 
which they build their safety cases: 
“This is about phenomena that manifest themselves only very slowly, so one may assume measurements 
will hardly show anything in the first decades during operations. Monitoring over this period can 
nevertheless be of use, for if measurements go in the right direction, then we can be sure of our models, and 
not only our models, but also of long-term safety.” (Respondent 3) 
 
Furthermore, several respondents indicated that several decades of monitoring should 
be enough to make accurate observations and extrapolations for the long-term, as the 
most crucial phase, in which the waste is at its thermal peak, will manifest itself 
relatively early in the process: 
“If no accidents occur in that period [i.e. an extended period of monitoring before closure of the facility], it 
should be enough to make a comfortable estimate of safety in the long-term.” (Respondent 3) 
“The thermal peak will manifest itself after 10 to 15 years, so after a few more decades we will be at the 
other end of that peak.” (Respondent 4). 
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“What is of relevance is the transient phase: during the heat producing phase in the case of high level and 
spent fuel the repository is in a kind of transient phase. You have the heat, … but also thermal contraction. 
And the thermal contraction is a relatively dangerous situation, as it might produce cracks. Another point 
is the sealing, the shaft seals for example, okay it depends on the concept, but the time until the Bentonite 
or whatever is used, has saturated, consolidated and so on this lasts some several years. And after that time 
the situation becomes more favourable. And if you monitor this phase and nothing happened you can be 
relatively sure that nothing will happen in the future because the heat is out and everything has 
consolidated. So what more could happen after that?” (Respondent 12)  
 
But then it still comes down to deciding which parameters one would like to measure 
(largely depending on context: the environment in which the repository is situated; the 
character of the wastes involved, etc.) and which are actually measurable.  
“I think we should focus on what is feasible and most likely. You cannot build scenarios on how to respond 
to something that is unlikely to happen for 10,000 years in advance. Moreover: who will be responsible for 
financing this?” (Respondent 2) 
 
This last remark brings to the surface that the question of what (as well as how) to 
monitor is in fact not only a question of science and technology, but also of economics 
and responsibilities. The challenges related to monitoring for assurance of post-closure 
safety may in large part be technical, but they also have an inescapable social 
component. We would therefore prefer to call them socio-technical challenges. 
 
2.3.2 Monitoring For Long-Term Safety as a Socio-Technical Challenge 
The inherently technical and social nature of the challenges facing monitoring for long-
term safety, becomes particularly explicit when considering the element of time scales, 
and the question of reconciling different expectations within society with physical and 
technical constraints. 
 
2.3.2.1 Monitoring, timescales and technological flexibility 
The very reason why the waste management community is so passionate about 
geological disposal as the best available option for the long-term management of HLW or 
spent fuel, is related to the extremely long timescales involved in the management of 
higher activity radioactive wastes. Several reasons are given for this. First of all, there is 
the frequently made ethical argument that to store the wastes on the surface over such 
an extremely long timescale would place an unacceptable burden on future generations, 
which would be required to renew periodically the waste containment and to maintain it 
continuously in a safe state. The second argument is essentially a sociological one, which 
maintains that geological disposal represents a geo-technical solution to an inherently 
social problem: the impossibility of guaranteeing the active safekeeping of the waste if it 
remains on the surface within a society, the institutional and social stability of which 
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cannot be assumed over time periods that exceed 300 years.10 Hence the concept of 
passive safety, relying totally on engineered and geological barriers to safeguard life on 
the surface from the potential harm of radioactive contamination. Finally, for many 
northern and alpine countries it is the prospect of future glacial periods which may 
erode the surface to considerable depths that also makes the case for deep geological 
disposal so compelling. Geological disposal is therefore presented as a solution both to 
the failings and transience of societal institutions and to inexorable natural processes. 
 
The extremely long timescale involved makes predictions on the future evolution of a 
facility, and therefore the potential future exposure of living beings to the radionuclides 
contained in the waste, uncertain. It furthermore makes it almost impossible to 
determine at the design stage all aspects of the monitoring programme to be carried out 
for the full length of the operations of the facility. Flexibility is therefore needed: 
“As long as there are parts of the repository that are not passive, monitoring will remain a necessity, but it 
will not be done in the same way in every place of the installation, nor over the whole period of time. … 
You have to look at monitoring as an evolving matter and not something that we define once and for all in 
2010.” (Respondent 6) 
 
In many ways this is seen as a good thing, as a positive challenge: 
“I see monitoring in a context of continuous R&D, of performance confirmation and continuously doubting 
ourselves and looking for possible ways of making our system better than it is today. We owe this to 
ourselves.” (Respondent 8) 
 “… this doesn’t mean that throughout the project we will always monitor in the same way. Possibly we 
will follow-up on many things in the beginning of the project and evaluate and adapt this as we go along. It 
is therefore very likely that the ways of monitoring will change and that its intensity will diminish over 
time.” (Respondent 3) 
“The logic is that monitoring serves to verify if it works. If we change our ways of working, or if we make 
changes to the concept in the course of the project, we will have to follow-up again until we are sure.” 
(Respondent 3) 
 
Accepting the need for flexibility inevitably introduces new challenges and poses the 
further question of ‘how flexible, and for how long?’: 
“The difficulty is that we do not know today for how long we will have to measure and observe. That does 
not make it easy to design sensors, for depending on which domain, those last on average today between 1 
to 2 years, and 60 years. … That is our biggest problem. As long as we do not know for how long we have 
to measure, we can never tell if we have the right sensors or not.” (Respondent 3) 
 
Maintaining flexibility in the monitoring programme in light of this continuing 
development may therefore present a variety of challenges, in particular that of 
                                                        
10
 300 years is the figure commonly used within the sector when making statements about the period over which 
institutional control of the waste facility might reasonably be assumed. 
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accommodating regulatory, that is to say social, expectations which may themselves 
continue to develop.  
 
2.3.2.2 Reconciling expectations with constraints 
A last important challenge is that of developing a technically and financially feasible 
monitoring strategy that can meet technical expert and regulatory requirements, as well 
as a diversity of public stakeholders’ expectations.   
“I think that strategically we’re in a very peculiar situation.  We have a rather ill-defined situation where 
what comes in from society and from some of the reviews of disposal is that everything should be 
monitored. And then even the regulators themselves are saying: “We want monitoring”. But they are also 
being very clear in saying: “Don’t you dare monitor things in a way that will damage the barriers”. Right? 
That’s what they’re saying. So the sort of clash of perspectives is pretty obvious.” (Respondent 14) 
 
As mentioned above, the experts that we interviewed, in line with international 
institutions, assume monitoring to play an important role in building public confidence. 
For that to be so, both the product and process of monitoring would have to meet 
different stakeholders’ expectations, while staying within the limits of what is 
scientifically sound and both technically and financially feasible. When developing 
monitoring programmes, this suggests that a dialogue with different types of 
stakeholders is needed, in order to develop mutual understanding of expectations and to 
address these in the design of the programme. Some see this as a source of conflict: 
 “So, you know, the public and society demand this, that you do something, and then there are the technical 
realities, and the regulatory requirements are also there, and all of them representing some sort of inherent 
conflict.” (Respondent 14)   
 
Others are more optimistic, pointing to the need to give the public the opportunity to 
raise questions, and to invite them to make their concerns known: 
“What we first need to do, is to gain confidence … and to understand their concerns. But I think we can 
answer a lot of their questions. The problem is that there are so many and that we cannot cover all of them 
in one go. It is a process that will develop in phases.” (Respondent 8) 
“… this way you get into a situation or approach within which you try to process and reconcile everything 
you gather as input from different actors. It is about looking for a consensus. … We have now a period of 
some 10 to 15 years ahead in which we can cut the Gordian knot and decide together which way to go. 
Today we are at a stage where we can say we are sure that we can dig 600 meters deep, so that we are ok 
where safety is concerned. What rests are negotiations with just about everybody: with scientists, technical 
experts, the safety authorities, the wider audience, … . On plenty of issues this will not give rise to long and 
intense discussions, more a question of wrapping up certain issues.” (Respondent 5) 
 
But even the more optimistic ones, were not entirely sure if there would be much use in 
focussing the discussion explicitly on monitoring. Most respondents saw monitoring as 
part of the bigger narrative of geological disposal, in which the question of monitoring 
inevitably will be treated, even if only indirectly, or subsequent to other issues: 
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“You need to discuss the whole issue. Just talking about monitoring is pointless. The first challenge for me 
is the whole issue about retrievability. As long as we aren’t clear on that one, it makes no sense to go and 
discuss the parameters that we would like to measure. And in this respect it is important to talk about the 
fundamentals of the concept and about safety being the absolute priority. It is good that people can make 
their own judgement about that. This worked quite well in our dialogues
11… It is important that citizens get 
to see that there are contradictory aspects and that we need to weigh these against each other. So we have 
to start discussing the concept and then start looking at what our stakeholders think important, why they 
think that important and what they think knowledge about certain parameters would contribute.” 
(Respondent 8) 
“In itself, monitoring may not give rise to much public interest, but once people start asking questions like: 
‘And how do you guarantee this will work?’, … I think it will be in this way, that a dialogue on monitoring 
will take form. And it may very well be that at that point, some very technical questions will be put to us. 
Maybe we don’t have much interaction on that subject today, but this will inevitably change at some point. 
Still, this is not likely to mobilize a crowd. We are talking here about a limited number of engaged and 
interested parties.” (Respondent 5)  
“Looking at monitoring in terms of performance confirmation, means demonstrating your repository is 
safe. You therefore cannot narrow this subject to discussing sensors and receivers. You have to frame it in 
a broader context and give people the chance to ask “Why would this site be safe? How can that be 
guaranteed?” (Respondent 2) 
 
These observations raise important questions about the framing not only of the 
exploratory engagement process proposed as part of the MoDeRn project, but also how 
we conceive more generally the relationship between stakeholders and the development 
of repository monitoring programmes. That is the focus of Section 4 of this report but 
before turning to that we examine what we already know or can infer from existing 
research and published documents about stakeholder views and experiences of 
monitoring in this field and in other relevant contexts. This will be the subject of the 
following section.  
 
                                                        
11
 The Belgian respondent refers here to a number of stakeholder dialogues and a public forum held in 
preparation of ONDRAF/NIRAS’ national waste management plan.  
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3   Stakeholders, Monitoring & Confidence 
Published accounts of the relationship between stakeholders and monitoring activities 
typically focus on case studies of specific communities, projects or monitoring 
programmes. In this section of the report we summarise cases drawn both from the 
peer-reviewed research literature and from reports produced by organisations whose 
activities are focused on the field of radioactive waste management. Before beginning to 
examine those cases, however, a first point to note is that it was not possible to identify 
any studies published in peer-reviewed journals that investigated explicitly the views of 
lay stakeholders on geological repository monitoring, although there are studies that 
address other areas of monitoring activity. A number of reports recording the 
expectations and activities of stakeholders in relation to radioactive waste management 
have, on the other hand, been published in the so-called grey literature. The discussion 
that follows therefore draws upon studies on monitoring in other contexts together with 
other documentary sources reporting on practical experience to glean insights into this 
issue. There is, to begin with, research on stakeholder, particularly community 
stakeholder, views on and experience of monitoring associated with other nuclear 
facilities or with potential radioactive contamination. In addition there is research on 
citizen and stakeholder involvement in monitoring in a variety of other contexts, from 
air pollution to natural resource management. The issue of monitoring in relation to 
long-term radioactive waste management has been discussed explicitly by stakeholders 
in a number of the meetings and reports of the Nuclear Energy Agency, notably of its 
Forum on Stakeholder Confidence (FSC), as well as in various national contexts. These 
reports include contributions drawn from a variety of stakeholder constituencies and 
give valuable insight into current practices as well as an indication of stakeholder 
experience and expectations. A second point to note is that not only are the research 
studies and documents that inform this section of the report drawn from different 
operational or problem contexts, they also range across different national contexts. As 
will already be apparent from the preceding section, despite there being research 
problems and programme goals that broadly are shared across different countries, the 
political, economic, and historical context in each country has a very significant 
influence on radioactive waste management policies and practices. Any observations 
offered here are therefore indicative of potential stakeholder interests, preferences, and 
concerns rather than providing predictive or prescriptive conclusions. With that caveat, 
the primary aim of this review is to complement the investigation of expert (or technical 
specialist) views in the previous section by providing some insight into potential 
stakeholder interests and concerns in order to take these into account when developing 
the exploratory stakeholder engagement activities to be carried out within the MoDeRn 
project (WP1.4), the results of which will then help to inform the development of a 
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repository monitoring reference framework, one of the final deliverables of the project 
(WP6).  
 
3.1 Environmental, Socio-economic, and Participatory Monitoring 
A distinction has already been drawn in the previous section of the report between 
different types of monitoring that may be carried out in the context of the construction, 
operation and long-term safety of a geological repository for higher activity radioactive 
wastes and spent (or ‘used’) fuel. Although the MoDeRn project is focused on strategies 
and technologies for monitoring repository and near field processes, when considering 
the role that monitoring may play in building and maintaining stakeholder confidence in 
a geological repository facility, it will be necessary to look to the overall monitoring 
programme associated with a repository project, as well as the network of relationships 
within which it is situated, when trying to answer the question of what is to be 
monitored, who that process should involve, and what roles the different actors might 
assume. Across the research literature reviewed, it is clear that most of the activities 
reported involve some sort of environmental monitoring. A further observation is that 
there is evidence of a variety of modes of organisation of monitoring, with one 
important feature being the extent to which a participatory approach is adopted. This 
aspect is singled out because it is consistent with the turn to collaborative or 
partnership-based approaches, involving the active engagement of stakeholders, 
adopted by radioactive waste management programmes in many countries, typically as 
a response to lack of stakeholder trust in implementing organisations or confidence in 
the safety of geological disposal. The remainder of Section 3 therefore summarises 
research findings on lay stakeholder attitudes towards monitoring and to experiences in 
different contexts, focusing in particular on radiological hazards. It includes examples of 
monitoring both the natural and the socio-economic environments, as well as examples 
of institutional, community and citizen monitoring activities. To begin with it considers 
environmental monitoring by local institutional stakeholders, including some examples 
that integrate monitoring of the socio-economic environment. It then looks at examples 
of monitoring for radiological contamination following known releases. It broadens this 
by bringing in examples of participatory environmental monitoring in response to 
concerns about other forms of environmental pollution before turning to examples of 
monitoring of radioactive waste and nuclear facilities, focusing in particular on the role 
of stakeholder and citizen involvement. Finally, it considers what the examples 
described tell us about the effects of these monitoring programmes on the stakeholders 
in these different contexts and activities, typically local citizens and community 
organisations, and on their relationships with experts, regulators and decision makers.  
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3.1.1 Environmental Monitoring 
It was noted above that some of the technical specialists involved in the field of long-
term radioactive waste management and geological disposal who were interviewed for 
the project had formed the view that citizens are primarily interested in environmental 
monitoring, seeing it as a source of reassurance that they and their communities are not 
being exposed to harmful releases of radionuclides. Our review of the literature suggests 
that this is indeed the most commonly cited type of monitoring demanded by or used to 
provide reassurance to citizens and stakeholders across a range of situations where 
radioactive materials or other hazards are concerned. Although the circumstances differ, 
the problem being addressed in almost all of these cases is one of public concern and 
information source credibility: the response is typically to establish monitoring 
arrangements that are perceived to be sufficiently independent and/or transparent for 
the results to be believed and for stakeholders to have confidence in the management of 
the situation. Importantly this does not necessarily mean that they automatically have 
confidence in all of the organisations involved in their particular situation but that, 
overall, they are assured that the source of their concern is subject to sustained scrutiny. 
In some cases this may simply entail the operation of a transparent system and 
monitoring and of reporting results by the operator of a particular facility; in others it 
may involve the development of complementary or autonomous monitoring 
mechanisms that can be used to discipline the operator for failure to meet socially 
acceptable standards by triggering regulatory sanctions. Between these two there are 
many variations and nuances. In what follows a variety of examples will be given to 
illustrate this. Some of them relate directly to monitoring of radioactive waste 
management facilities and some to other contexts but all of them highlight issues and 
experience that are relevant to the context of geological disposal.  
 
3.1.2 Socio-economic Monitoring 
Before moving on to outline these examples it is important to note that in addition to 
concerns about human health and environmental protection, local stakeholders may 
also be concerned about socio-economic and other impacts. In the first instance, this 
may involve concerns about the socio-economic impacts of a major construction project 
on the area and its communities. Monitoring socio-economic changes over time, using 
both quantitative indicators and qualitative data on community perceptions and 
concerns, can provide valuable information about trends and improve the management 
of the project (Glasson 2005). Glasson’s study reports a study conducted during the 
construction of the Sizewell B nuclear power station in the United Kingdom, a site that 
already had an established nuclear power station but which had become the focus of 
national opposition during the public planning inquiry into its construction and where 
local residents harboured concerns about the impact of such a large project on their 
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communities. Reviewing the results, Glasson (2005) argues that this type of monitoring 
not only enables timely intervention to mitigate negative impacts but that it can also be 
used to demonstrate positive impacts that deliver benefits to affected communities; a 
function that may contribute significantly to the formation of local attitudes towards a 
project.  
 
An example of an integrated approach to environmental monitoring is provided by Clark 
County, Nevada, a metropolitan area which includes Las Vegas and four other cities. The 
County has a long history of sustained opposition to the proposed radioactive waste 
repository at Yucca Mountain. Wastes in transit to the repository would pass through 
the county, raising concerns about the effect of ‘nuclear stigma’ on the tourism 
economy12 and about quality of life impacts, as well as public health and safety. Research 
suggests that, set in the context of the institutional politics of the siting proposal, 
opposition was strongly linked to distrust in the US Department of Energy (Pijawka and 
Mushkatel 1991). Clark County responded to the federal decision to focus on Yucca 
Mountain by developing a monitoring system to give it and its communities ‘early 
warning’ of any changes in the local environment (Conway et al 2009). When 
considering the range of indicators to be monitored the County decided to monitor not 
only the well-being of the natural environment and of public health, but also quality of 
life, socio-economic and fiscal well-being, resulting in a suite of more than 800 
indicators. Indices derived from these indicators enable trends in the data to be tracked. 
After a period of development, the system went live in December 2004. It is accessible 
via a public website so that not only decision makers but also local citizens are able to 
review the results. The indicator monitoring is supplemented with annual focused 
interviews with local decision makers, a bi-annual survey of local citizens and a 
quarterly indicator report that summarises results and trends in a form that makes them 
easily understandable by the general public. Although plans for a repository at Yucca 
Mountain are currently in abeyance, Clark County is reported to have already derived 
benefit from its monitoring and information system. Although originally conceived as a 
decision support tool for the County, the system is also being utilised by four of the five 
local city administrations, as well as being adopted by public stakeholders for engaging 
citizens in dialogue about local service provision (Conway et al 2009). So here again we 
see that not only are environmental and health monitoring being integrated with a range 
of other variables but that the development of an integrated system may have benefits 
beyond that of reassurance by providing an information platform which creates new 
capacities and potentials for community empowerment and action.  
                                                        
12
 Research by Slovic et al (1991) was important in supporting this concern but the likelihood of sustained 
economic effects has been questioned by other researchers and a review of studies of several analogous 
situations concluded that although this effect was a possible consequence of repository siting in the State, the 
evidence available at that time could not confirm that it would occur (Easterling 1997).  
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3.1.3 Stakeholder Roles in Monitoring 
These initial examples involve local government bodies establishing monitoring 
programmes and systems that reflect their areas of institutional interest and 
competence, albeit in partnership with other organisations. However, as we shall see, 
local monitoring initiatives can take a variety of forms and can involve stakeholders and 
citizens in different roles in relation to the monitoring programme. Several of the 
examples point to a more active role for citizens and their representatives in 
environmental monitoring. This reflects the convergence of a number of societal trends 
that can be observed around the globe:  
 Firstly, the attempt by scientific and technical institutions to engage in a 
constructive way with citizens on science and technology issues, in particular 
where these relate to issues that are a matter of wider societal concern or which 
concern or affect citizens in particular geographical locations or social groups13;  
 Secondly, political recognition of and response to changing societal concerns 
about and changing expectations of the use of scientific and technical expertise in 
policy, leading not only to attempts to inform citizens but also to experiments in - 
and even requirements for - citizen engagement in the development and 
implementation of such policies14; and  
 Thirdly, the appropriation by community-based organisations of the resources 
and tools of science in order to address environmental problems of local concern 
(e.g. the cases outlined by Ottinger and Cohen 2011).  
 
Participatory monitoring is now widely used in natural resource research and 
management, both as a low-cost means of data acquisition where financial resources are 
limited and, importantly, as a way of engaging, educating and empowering local 
populations in the management of the natural environment on which their communities 
and livelihoods depend.15 Some of these involve innovative uses of information 
technology to link communities and establish information networks (e.g. Mayfield et al 
2001). Similarly, there are recent initiatives that involve citizens in monitoring natural 
                                                        
13
 This development was encouraged by academic researchers who critiqued institutional attitudes towards the 
‘lay’ public, focusing in particular on the often implicit ‘knowledge deficit’ model which attributes public 
concern to a lack of understanding, and highlighting examples in which local knowledge and ‘lay expertise’ 
could be shown to offer valid insight into particular problems (e.g. Irwin and Wynne 1996). 
14
 This has been driven, in part, by high profile failures of the system of policy expertise, such as that associated 
with the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or ‘mad cow disease’) outbreak in the United Kingdom 
(Jasanoff 1997), which had a profound impact on public confidence. The importance of a ‘democratisation of 
expertise’ for public confidence in policy expertise and in the institutions that use it is argued in EC (2001) and 
can be seen as complementing the institutionalisation of regulatory independence and transparency (e.g. Wales et 
al 2006). 
15
 See, for example, the review by Conrad and Hilchey (2009) or the individual case studies provided by: 
Hartanto et al (2002); Kingham (2002); Robinson et al (2000); Savan et al (2003). 
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hazards and in helping to mitigate the risk to their communities. In a minimal example 
of participation, one such scheme simply utilises the capacities of individuals’ home 
computers to create an earthquake sensor network, but at the same time helps to raise 
awareness and understanding of the hazard (Cochrane et al 2009). Another involves 
local people who live in earthquake-prone areas being trained to monitor movement on 
unstable slopes in order to gain early warning of impending landslide events (Karnawati 
et al 2009). Citizen and stakeholder participation in monitoring activities is therefore a 
trend that is appearing in many different fields beyond that of radioactive waste 
management. 
 
3.2 Institutional Failure, Community Monitoring and Empowerment 
Participatory monitoring of environmental hazards may not only be carried out but also 
initiated by citizens themselves, rather than by regulatory or other institutions. Typical 
circumstances would be where there is a perception of institutional failure and of 
consequent injustice. This may arise from a perception of institutional bias, for example 
if regulators are perceived to be too ‘close’ to the originators of the risks that they 
regulate, but may arise simply where resource constraints are perceived to affect the 
competence of regulatory agencies to monitor hazards effectively, so that agencies are 
perceived to be slow to investigate or to take action (see Freudenburg 1993). One well-
studied example that illustrates this is the US ‘bucket brigade’ movement which 
monitors local industrial air pollution. Citizens groups receive training, from a small 
national NGO, in the use of simple, low-cost air quality sampling equipment (the 
eponymous ‘bucket’); samples collected are then sent to certified laboratories for 
analysis. When the results confirm exceedance of permitted air quality standards, the 
community forwards the laboratory’s report to the regulator for action (O’Rourke and 
Macey 2003; Overdevest and Mayer 2008; Ottinger 2010a). Care is taken to ensure the 
quality of data collected by community monitors; for example, to avoid ad hoc 
monitoring that may record unrepresentative data, bucket brigade activists in Louisiana 
have adopted monitoring procedures which replicate those used by the state 
environmental regulator (Ottinger 2010a).16 Although these initiatives typically emerge 
as a consequence of a lack of confidence, by empowering citizens they may not only 
improve regulatory effectiveness by complementing agency capacity but may also have 
other important social consequences, a point to which we return in Section 3.5. Before 
that we turn to examples of monitoring at radioactive waste management and other 
nuclear facilities. 
                                                        
16
 Ottinger (2010b) develops this point, noting that the empowerment experienced by citizens in her study arises 
not merely from the collection of independent data but from the strategic interpretation and utilisation of those 
data, and identifies three specific ways in which this is expressed: as giving them power to define the issue; 
power to enforce regulation; and power to make choices.  
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3.3 Participatory Monitoring in Response to Known Radioactive Releases 
A similar turn to stakeholder involvement and citizen participation in monitoring can be 
found in a number of contexts that involve the management of radiation hazards. There 
are, to begin with, several examples from the USA, extending back over more than 30 
years, of citizens participating in environmental radiation monitoring in situations 
where there were known to have been releases and where as a consequence there were 
local concerns about contamination. Here we outline three cases that are well 
documented in the research literature: Three Mile Island, the Nevada Test site and 
Amchitka Island.  
 
3.3.1 Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, USA 
The first of these programmes was established with the communities around the nuclear 
power plant at Three Mile Island (TMI), Pennsylvania following the accident there in 
1979, during which there was a relatively small release of radioactive material. The 
accident eroded community trust not only in the facility operator but also in the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC), leading many affected citizens to mistrust all officially 
sourced information. The local communities were therefore very hostile to proposals to 
release low levels of radioactive krypton-85 gas from the damaged reactor in order to 
proceed with clean up, even though the NRC had judged the venting to present no threat 
to human health, and to plans to reopen the undamaged second plant on the site 
(Walker 2006: 226). The situation was therefore one of mounting conflict. The 
Department of Energy responded by bringing together a team which included experts 
from the Environmental Protection Agency, the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Resources, Pennsylvania State University and a technical consultant to 
design, in close collaboration with local state and municipal officials from within a five-
mile radius of the plant, a programme that would address citizens’ concerns and 
information needs and provide a basis for their assent to the venting of the gas going 
ahead: this resulted in the Three Mile Island Citizen Radiation Monitoring Program 
(TMI-CRMP) (Baratta et al 1981; Gray Gricar and Baratta 1983). The citizens who were 
to carry out data collection for the monitoring programme were chosen by the members 
of each community and given the necessary training by the agencies. Community 
members had greater confidence in the resulting data because they had far greater trust 
in the individuals who were collecting it but also, as an outcome of the process, in the 
government agencies involved in the programme. The venting of the krypton gas 
subsequently went ahead, closely monitored by the community network. The practical 
outcomes of this participatory monitoring programme offer an effective illustration of 
the benefits of adopting a collaborative approach that includes the whole range of 
stakeholders (Gray 1989). Interestingly, although the original monitoring programme 
was established to address what was seen to be a problem with a relatively defined time 
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span and despite the improvement in public confidence and community relationships 
that resulted, in 1989 a successor network, the TMI Citizens’ Monitoring Network (TMI-
CMN), was set up with financial support from the TMI Public Health Fund by a small 
group of local citizens who continued to be concerned about their radiological 
environment.17 This network, which has about 30 members, is therefore quite different 
to the Department of Energy (DOE)-sponsored collaboration that was established in 
1979, although it involves citizens engaging in similar monitoring activities. It can be 
seen as evidence of continued distrust on the part of some local citizens of information 
provided by regulators or by the company that operates the nuclear power station, but 
also of reluctance to relinquish the sense of empowerment gained through active 
involvement in monitoring. 
 
In another development arising from the TMI event, a not-for-profit organisation, the 
EFMR Group, was established by a local citizen which facilitates radiological monitoring 
by citizens and which also has the educational aim of increasing community 
understanding of radiation; in this capacity it has worked with a wide range of groups, 
including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency 
and the Los Alamos National Laboratory.18 Radiological monitoring by citizen groups 
also goes on at US sites other than TMI, such as the C-10 Radiological Monitoring 
Network around the Seabrook nuclear power plant in southern New Hampshire, which 
has been in existence since 1990.19 In all of these cases, if elevated readings are recorded 
by local volunteers the group contacts the site operator and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission for clarification of the likely cause.  
 
3.3.2 The Nevada Test Site, USA 
The TMI-CRMP became the model for another initiative in participatory monitoring of 
radionuclides in the environment, the Community Environmental Monitoring Program 
(CEMP), that was established in 1981 around the Nevada nuclear test area, where the 
USA conducted weapons testing until 1992 (Douglas 1983; DeSilva 2004). Rather than 
concern about the effects of an unintended event (and the corrective measures involved 
in dealing with it), as was the case at TMI, here the concerns among local populations 
were about the health effects of a series of planned events. Like the TMI CRMP, the CEMP 
was initiated as a collaboration between: the DOE; the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA); the Desert Research Institute (DRI), a local higher education institution; and the 
communities bordering the test site. Local citizens were trained to operate a network of 
monitoring stations that was established around the test area (school teachers have 
                                                        
17
 Brief information about the TMI-CMN can be found at: http://www.tmi-cmn.org/index.html  
18
 Information about EFMR can be found at: http://www.efmr.org/index.html  
19
 Brief information about C-10/RMN can be found at: http://www.greens.org/s-r/11/11-21.html  
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been particularly well represented in this role). At its inception in 1981 the network had 
15 monitoring stations ranged around the test area and across three contiguous states: 
California, Nevada and Utah. In 1999 administration of the programme was transferred 
from the EPA to the DRI and by 2007 its network had been extended to 29 stations 
spread across 160,000 km2, using state of the art equipment and trialling new 
environmental sensors (Hartwell and Shafer 2007). In addition to maintaining the 
monitoring stations, the trained community monitors respond to questions from local 
citizens and engage in outreach to their communities, thereby acting as a two-way 
channel of communication and ensuring that the regulatory agencies are aware of local 
environmental concerns (Hartwell et al 2001).20 
 
3.3.3 Amchitka Island, Alaska, USA 
One final example is Amchitka Island, Alaska, which was the site of three underground 
nuclear weapons tests in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Despite scientific assessments 
following the tests, there was little monitoring of local biota after the 1970s and there 
continued to be concern about possible contamination (Benning et al 2009). The US 
DOE’s proposal to ‘close’ Amchitka and end its responsibility for the site heightened 
those concerns, which led to the establishment of the Consortium for Risk Evaluation 
with Stakeholder Participation, a collaboration between federal and state agencies, 
stakeholder groups, including indigenous Aleut people, and scientific researchers. 
Instead of a conventional stakeholder communication approach this initiative involved 
Aleut hunters in collecting data, thus utilising their knowledge of the island and of the 
fauna that are found there (Burger et al 2009). Outcomes included reduced Aleut 
concern about radionuclides and an increased interest in monitoring ecological changes 
(Burger and Gochfeld 2009). Furthermore the inclusive and collaborative approach not 
only addressed a significant data gap but empowering local citizens and stakeholder 
groups also resolved the conflict which hitherto had characterised the situation (Burger 
et al 2009).  
 
 
                                                        
20
 Another participatory initiative focused on the Nevada nuclear test area, the Nuclear Risk Management for 
Native Communities Project, was established as a collaborative research project by researchers from Clark 
University in Massachusetts and the Citizen Alert Native American Programme based in Ely, Nevada (Quigley 
et al 2000). Unlike the CEMP this had a fixed life of four years; nevertheless, it combined educational and 
action-oriented goals that aimed to equip the local Ely-Shoshone people, who felt that their needs were not being 
met by existing institutional arrangements, with additional resources that would enable them to continue their 
activities beyond the life of the project.  
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3.4 Monitoring Associated with Radioactive Waste Management 
Turning to monitoring associated with radioactive waste management activities and 
with the operation of waste facilities or repositories, we can find a number of cases that 
are directly relevant to the MoDeRn project for what they can tell us about the concerns 
and expectations of stakeholders in particular contexts and about the arrangements that 
have been arrived at to address these concerns. 
 
3.4.1 The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, New Mexico, USA 
One of the few examples of an operating geological repository is the Waste Isolation 
Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico, USA, which began disposal operations in 1999 and 
which accepts transuranic wastes generated at nuclear weapons facilities. Surveys 
tracking public attitudes over a period of 11 years, from before the opening of the 
facility into its operational phase, found mixed views across the State of New Mexico, 
with acceptance of the facility highest in the area closest to the repository (Jenkins-
Smith et al 2011). Key stakeholders in the local community of Carlsbad are enthusiastic 
champions of the facility, currently lobbying for a high level waste facility to be sited 
there21, and monitoring plays an important part in demonstrating the safety of the 
facility and in maintaining local confidence in its operations. Monitoring is carried out by 
the Carlsbad Environmental and Monitoring Research Centre (CEMRC), which was set 
up in 1991 in a local college of New Mexico State University to conduct independent 
health and environmental monitoring and to disseminate the results (Conca et al 2008). 
Funding came from the DOE, although CEMRC carries out its work independently of the 
DOE and its data are not used for regulatory compliance purposes. Its radiological 
monitoring covers not only all relevant environmental media but also whole body 
dosimetry of volunteers recruited from the community. The CEMRC’s analyses provide 
an independent check on those carried out by regulatory and other organisations, 
providing assurance of their reliability to local decision makers and to other members of 
the local community. Even before Carlsbad set up the CEMRC, the State of New Mexico 
had established, in 1978, an Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) to provide 
independent scientific expertise and oversight of the WIPP project. This independent 
scientific oversight extended to scrutiny of the geological and hydrogeological data and 
of the assumptions informing the performance assessment for the WIPP. From 1985 
onwards the EEG also carried out radiological monitoring around the WIPP site and in 
neighbouring communities. The EEG was disbanded in 2004 and a contract for 
independent technical oversight and evaluation was awarded to a private company, 
PECOS Management Services Inc., which continues to be funded by the DOE (Bergmans 
2010; NEA 2010a). 
                                                        
21
 As evidenced by an address given by former Mayor of Carlsbad, Robert Forrest, to the WM2012 conference, 
Phoenix, Arizona, 29 February 2012.  
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3.4.2 Nye County, Nevada, USA 
The case of Clark County, Nevada, which has been opposed to the Yucca Mountain (YM) 
project, was outlined above. Another Nevadan county has adopted a rather different 
stance but some similar measures. The Yucca Mountain site is located within the Nevada 
Test Site (now known as the Nevada National Security Site), which in turn is situated in 
Nye County. The county therefore has long experience of nuclear issues and has adopted 
what it describes as a ‘constructive’ approach towards the YM project, seeing it as a 
potential source of economic benefit. Under the amended Nuclear Waste Policy Act, local 
government units such as Nye County that are affected by proposals for Yucca Mountain 
are accorded specified rights of participation, funding and on-site representation. Nye 
County set up a Nuclear Waste Repository Project Office (NWRPO) which engages in 
monitoring and testing studies, focused in particular on geology, hydrogeology and 
engineering (NEA 2008). One of the objectives of NWRPO’s Independent Science 
Investigation Program (ISIP), established in 1994, is the reduction of uncertainty in DOE 
Yucca Mountain Project performance assessment models. Data are collected in 
accordance with a Quality Assurance programme that has been reviewed by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission22 and are shared with the DOE, as well as being publicly 
available on the NWRPO website.23 Financial support for this initiative came from the 
DOE, which provided funds to the State of Nevada, to 10 affected counties, and to the 
Timbisha Shoshone Tribe to enable them to conduct independent scientific oversight of 
the Yucca Mountain project (Bergmans 2010: 28). 
 
The Carlsbad and Nye County cases are examples of local government institutions that 
are broadly supportive of repository projects engaging in monitoring activities to ensure 
and to contribute to the safety of the facility. Importantly they also demonstrate that 
stakeholder institutions choosing to carry out independent monitoring and evaluation is 
not only associated with opposition but may also be a necessary basis for confidence and 
credibility in the context of constructive engagement with a repository project. Finally, 
unlike many of the other examples given, where the focus was on environmental 
monitoring for possible contamination, these two cases also show local stakeholders 
reviewing critically the scientific basis for assessing future repository performance, with 
this extending in the case of Nye County to an independent programme of data 
collection.  
                                                        
22
 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Acceptance Evaluation for Nye County Quality Assurance Program 
Plan, March 1999. 
23
 http://www.nyecounty.com/LSN/index/EWDP/water_data.htm  
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3.4.3 Port Hope, Ontario, Canada 
The municipality of Port Hope in Ontario, Canada has been dealing with a legacy of low 
level radioactive wastes arising from more than 40 years of radium and uranium 
processing. Although there had been earlier phases of clean up during the 1970s, there 
were remaining areas within the town still to be remediated. In the late 1980s an 
informal network was assembled involving national regulatory bodies and the local 
municipality that drew up a Remedial Action Plan (RAP) focusing on contamination in 
the town’s harbour. The RAP allocated clear responsibilities to all of the partners, 
including a Community Liaison Group which assessed the potential impacts of the 
contaminated sediments and reviewed all of the mitigation and remediation options. 
The successful implementation of this collaboratively structured and managed process 
was seen as a success story by national regulators and as a model to be emulated 
elsewhere (Weston 1995). Building on this successful collaboration the community and 
the regulators explored and proposed solutions for the remaining LLW clean up and for 
the long-term management of the wastes. This resulted in 2001 in a legal agreement 
being signed and the Port Hope Area Initiative (PHAI) being established. Central to this 
agreement is the understanding that the Federal Government has responsibility for the 
wastes and importantly for the long-term management, monitoring and maintenance of 
the final LLW waste facility but also that the community has control of the final project 
solution (NEA 2003: 57-58). During the FSC workshop held in Ottawa in 2002, 
presentations and discussions about the Canadian situation, referring not only on the 
example of Port Hope but also to others drawn from the mining and waste management 
sectors, emphasised repeatedly the importance for community confidence of 
transparent environmental and socioeconomic monitoring including, in more than one 
case, the creation of a role for local interests in monitoring a facility (NEA 2003: 106-
107).  
 
This Canadian case also serves to highlight the importance of context and of the overall 
set of arrangements within which monitoring is taking place for the degree of public 
confidence in the process. As well as adopting a collaborative approach to the clean up 
project, with open reporting to the affected communities24, an important feature of the 
PHAI is that the Municipality has its own Peer Review Team (MPRT), delivered by a 
multidisciplinary consultancy firm in collaboration with a network of other specialist 
consultants as required, which can provide independent scrutiny of technical documents 
and ensure their quality, thus enabling the municipality to propose as well as to accept 
or reject remediation and long-term waste management measures. The MRPT reviewed 
the 16 volumes of the initial Environmental Assessment Study Report that subsequently 
                                                        
24
 The Port Hope Area Initiative involves two projects, one addressing the long-term waste management problem 
in Port Hope itself and the other in neighbouring Port Granby.  
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provided the basis for the reports to date. The now long-established collaborative 
relationship has improved confidence in regulators (Gardiner et al 2011) but it is clear 
from the emphasis given to the role of the Municipal Peer Review Team on the 
community’s website that having the technical capacity to evaluate critically the basis of 
remediation and long-term waste management proposals is important to that 
confidence.25 The Municipality consequently has a very strong sense of local ownership 
of the solution, presenting it to local citizens as a ‘made-in-Port Hope Project [...] using 
environmental criteria for the clean-up that are specific to circumstances in this 
community’.26 Although this has not eliminated all concern about environmental and 
health risks in the local community (see, for example, Fried and Eyles 2011) the 
Municipality reports steadily increasing levels of citizen confidence, with 84% of the 
residents who responded to the 2011 attitude survey expressing confidence in the 
ability of the PHAI Management Office to safely manage the waste for the long term.27 
 
3.4.4 Meuse/Haute-Marne Underground Research Laboratory, Bure, France 
France provides another example of local communities becoming engaged in monitoring 
programmes but in a way that is institutionalised in formally recognised local bodies 
with prescribed roles and functions. The Local Information and Tracking (or oversight) 
Committee (Comités locaux d’information et de suivi or CLIS) established to represent 
local stakeholders in the process of siting, constructing and operating an underground 
rock laboratory (URL) at Bure is an institutional development, based in provisions 
introduced in the 1991 Waste Act. The Waste Act also introduced the requirement for 
wastes to be retrievable from a repository, thereby ensuring an important role for 
monitoring to provide the necessary information about the repository system (Kriguer, 
in NEA 2010b, p. 10). During discussions at the 2009 FSC workshop French stakeholder 
representatives clearly expressed the view that monitoring by the implementer and 
regulator was necessary but was not sufficient for stakeholder confidence, emphasising 
the need for independent laboratories also to be involved (NEA 2010b: 36). The 
importance of independent monitoring is borne out by the results of a questionnaire 
survey, which found that the CLIS’s involvement in environmental and health 
monitoring is the role that, together with the provision of information, is most valued by 
its local citizens (Colon, in NEA 2010b: 15). Although environmental monitoring is 
required to meet regulatory requirements, the CLIS contracted an independent review 
of the environmental monitoring plan produced by the implementer, Andra, and insisted 
on additional measures to those proposed for water and radiological monitoring (NEA 
                                                        
25
 The relevant page, including links to the Municipal Peer Review Team’s main reports, can be found at: 
http://www.porthope.ca/en/residentservices/peerReviewTeam.asp.  
26
 http://www.porthope.ca/en/residentservices/what_is.asp  
27
 http://www.porthope.ca/en/residentservices/Commentary.asp  
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2010b: 33). The CLIS has also pressed for epidemiological surveillance and although 
attempts to establish a regional programme were unsuccessful, it formed its own 
environment and health group in order to maintain a watching brief on this issue (ibid.).  
 
The Local Information Commission (CLI) at Soulaine-Dhuys in France, which since 1992 
has been host to the Aube repository for low and intermediate level radioactive waste, 
also took the step of commissioning independent radionuclide monitoring around the 
facility following the discovery of ‘hotspots’, even though these did not exceed 
regulatory limits. The Mayor of the community, also addressing the FSC workshop in 
France, spoke of this as the CLI ‘waking from its torpor’; he also noted that by taking this 
initiative it increased its credibility (NEA 2010b: 33). He also maintained that 
independent expertise is ‘fundamentally necessary’ if local stakeholder bodies such as 
the CLI are to move beyond polarisation into pro- and anti-nuclear sources and achieve 
local confidence and support.  
 
3.4.5 Vandellòs i l’Hospitalet de l’Infant nuclear power plant, Catalonia, Spain 
We find a stakeholder body taking on a similar role to that of the CLIS as part of the 
decommissioning process at the Vandellòs i l’Hospitalet de l’Infant nuclear power plant 
in Catalonia, Spain. The Spanish National Radioactive Waste Management Company 
(ENRESA) conducts its own environmental monitoring programme at the site (Ortiz et al 
2004), which is overseen by the regulator. A Decommissioning Information Committee, 
comprised of representatives of national, regional and municipal government bodies, 
was also established to oversee the decommissioning process. 28 In addition to these 
institutional arrangements, however, representatives of affected municipalities wanted 
closer scrutiny of the process. The outcome was the formation, with the cooperation of 
ENRESA, of a local Municipal Monitoring (or Tracking) Commission to provide local 
oversight of all aspects of decommissioning (ENRESA 2004). The role of this commission 
included oversight of radiological and other forms of environmental monitoring, and of 
other surveillance and control systems including those governing work process, on-site 
safety and materials management. Membership of the Commission included 
representatives of the affected local municipalities and of regional government, of local 
commerce and trades unions, of the power plant and of ENRESA (NEA 2007b). One 
additional member organisation, the Rovira i Virgili University (URV) of Tarragona, 
                                                        
28
 The national Association of Municipalities in Areas with Nuclear Power Plants (Asociación de Municipios en 
Áreas con Centrales Nucleares - AMAC), formed in Tarragona in 1988 and now extended to cover other nuclear 
facilities, has promoted the formation of local committees for monitoring and information provision at nuclear 
power plants. Nevertheless, despite its undoubted contribution to the development of the capacities of these 
communities, a sociological study of AMAC concluded that its level of empowerment is relatively low (Garcia 
Hom and Sáez Giol, undated).  
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played an important role in enhancing the capacity of the Commission to provide 
oversight of the decommissioning activities. URV’s Environmental Analysis and 
Management Group provided technical advice, undertook independent review of 
ENRESA’s reports and helped to ‘translate’ technical information to make it accessible to 
local citizens; this was seen as an important innovation by the local municipalities and 
supported the Commission’s communication with the wider community (Castells, p. 15; 
Castellnou, p. 69; in NEA 2007b).  
 
3.4.6 Radioactive waste storage and disposal facilities, Hungary 
One final case, which displays many of the same features as the preceding examples but 
which introduces an important additional development, is that of the public oversight 
and information associations (POIAs) established at Hungarian radioactive waste 
management and disposal sites. Licensees of Hungarian radioactive waste facilities are 
required to support the formation of POIAs at their sites. POIAs have been established 
for each of the country’s radioactive waste management sites, including the interim 
spent fuel store at the Paks nuclear power plant (NPP), the near surface low and 
intermediate level waste (LILW) repository at Püspökszilágy, the planned new LILW 
repository at Bátaapáti, and the potential high level waste repository location at Boda 
(NEA 2009: 5). These associations perform a role that in many respects is the same as 
that of the French CLIS de Bure, in particular; their role in monitoring, however, goes 
further than that of the CLIS. The first POIA was established in 1992 during the planning 
process for the interim store at the Paks NPP. Its role at that time was to monitor 
background radiation levels and to provide information to the local communities. It did 
this, with financial support from the NPP operator, by commissioning independent 
experts to collect data from monitoring equipment sited in the communities (Vári and 
Ferencz 2007). This role has developed, however, with POIAs playing an important role 
in mediating the relationship between implementer and communities. Their approach to 
their monitoring responsibilities has also evolved and they have now developed what 
amounts to a monitoring partnership with the implementer and the regulator. Rather 
than simply calling on independent experts to check the monitoring carried out by the 
implementer and overseen by the regulator, members of local communities are now 
involved in inspecting waste packages received at the facilities and also in taking various 
monitoring measurements in and around the facility, a role for which they receive 
individual training that takes around one year (NEA 2009).  
 
The role undertaken by the Hungarian POIAs is in some ways similar to the citizen 
environmental monitoring carried out in the USA that was described earlier in that it 
involves citizens taking responsibility for participating in monitoring activities. It is also 
distinctive however in that none of these other examples involved citizens carrying out 
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direct inspections within an operational facility rather than being restricted to 
conducting monitoring of the environment around it. In discussing the Canadian 
example of the Port Hope Area initiative above we noted the importance of the 
institutional context and relationships within which monitoring was taking place for 
confidence in the process. This is also highlighted in the Hungarian case where research 
has found that the activities of the POIAs are significantly influenced by their social and 
political context; for example, stakeholders at the planned HLW repository site at Boda 
have been reported as expressing concerns about the stability of the national radioactive 
waste strategy as successive political changes resulted in interruptions to the repository 
research programme, which raised concerns about its lack of transparency (Vári, in NEA 
2009). Vári and Ferencz (2007) note therefore that while it is possible to find some 
evidence for transparency at a local level, this has not been the case in relation to the 
regional or national level; a condition that could therefore undermine local confidence.  
 
3.4.7 Local Processes, External Events and Stakeholder Confidence 
This last point, about the potential impact of events at the national level, raises an issue 
that is significant for this report: repository siting and development programmes tend to 
focus on building constructive relationships between implementer and communities at 
the local level. Many of the examples given in this section represent just such initiatives; 
others have been a response to perceived or real failures at institutional level. However, 
interactions between events and processes at different levels of political and institutional 
organisation have the capacity potentially to destabilise relationships that have 
painstakingly been developed among a network of actors at local level. This brings to 
mind Slovic’s often repeated axiom about the ‘asymmetry’ of trust - that it is much easier 
to destroy than to create – and his observations about the way in which wider social 
institutional and technological changes may have pronounced consequences for public 
confidence in specific technologies and projects and for the functioning of trust 
relationships in these contexts (Slovic 1993). At the same time, the element of 
contingency and of susceptibility to apparently ‘external’ influences that this 
interconnectedness introduces also suggests that it is not possible to apply a simple 
metric of trust that could predict its stability in the face of disruptions to established 
relationships.29 As Gooday (2004: 272) suggests, ‘the business of trusting people, 
                                                        
29
 Poortinga and Pidgeon (2004) point to the influence of prior beliefs on the extent to which trust is resilient to 
such perturbations. Nevertheless, those beliefs may themselves be shaped by prior events in the wider national or 
even international context. This is clearly illustrated by Poortinga and Pidgeon’s own example of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) in the UK. In that case a series of apparently unrelated issues, most notably that of 
expert misjudgement and government mishandling associated with the outbreak of bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE or ‘mad cow disease’) and its links to the human condition of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease 
(CJD), influenced public beliefs about the expert advisory system and about government management of food-
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instruments, and materials is in many ways a subject beyond measurement’. Having 
noted the significance of contingent contextual factors, however, it is clear that the cases 
presented here, despite being drawn from a variety of national contexts, display a 
number of commonalities and recurrent themes. These are discussed in the remainder 
of this section, beginning with a review of the positive outcomes reported in many of 
these examples as a result of citizen stakeholder participation in monitoring activities.  
 
3.5  Concluding Observations 
3.5.1 Positive Outcomes Claimed for Stakeholder Participation in Monitoring 
Several of the studies reviewed note that involvement in monitoring can contribute to 
learning by increasing stakeholder awareness and understanding of the nature of the 
problem and also of the science that underpins its management (e.g. Gray 1989; 
Hartwell et al 2001; Burger and Gochfeld 2009). It can also mediate the relationship 
between citizens and experts in new and potentially constructive ways (Ottinger 2009). 
 
3.5.1.1 Increasing confidence in monitoring and management programmes 
Importantly there is evidence from several of these cases that some form of 
participation can increase stakeholder confidence in monitoring and management 
programmes.  The study of participatory environmental monitoring on Amchitka Island, 
Alaska, found that not only did the Aleut people become less concerned about 
radionuclides but that they also became more trusting of the experts involved in the 
programme (Burger and Gochfeld 2009). Similarly the Three Mile Island Community 
Citizen Radiation Monitoring Programme (TMI CRMP) helped to re-establish public 
confidence in information about the facility, which had declined significantly as a result 
of the 1979 accident, by involving them in the collection of data (Gray Gricar and Baratta 
1983). The Nevada Test Site Community Environmental Monitoring Programme (CEMP) 
also reports greater public confidence in monitoring results as a consequence of 
involving citizens in data collection (Hartwell and Shafer 2007). All of these cases have 
in common a situation in which there was public concern about radionuclide 
contamination following either intended or unintended releases. Enhanced confidence 
has also been reported, however, in those countries where stakeholders have been 
involved in defining monitoring arrangements or in carrying out monitoring activities at 
radioactive waste and nuclear facilities. For example, in the case of the Belgian surface 
repository for low-level waste, local stakeholders were concerned about the risk 
presented by the high ground water level; engagement at the design stage led to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
related risk, which in turn affected confidence in expert evaluation and government handling of the risks 
associated with GMOs (Simmons and Weldon 2000).  
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modifications that created a space beneath the repository where this could be readily 
monitored, satisfying stakeholder concerns and increasing confidence in the safety of 
the facility (Bergmans et al 2006).  
 
“Local monitoring of an RWM facility is an arrangement that promotes acceptance by increasing trust 
and perceived security. It is also appealing to those focusing on justice, since it empowers the less 
powerful.” (Vari, in NEA 2004c: 82-83) 
 
3.5.1.2 Added value: enhancing social capital and community capacities 
Another, wider, social consequence of the active involvement of citizens themselves in 
monitoring programmes lies in its potential for enhancing social capital; that is, the 
integrative social fabric of a community, by developing new social capacities, enhancing 
mutual understanding and social relationships, and fostering more active forms of 
citizenship.30 It may do this by enhancing both ‘bonding’ social capital - the links that 
bind a group or community together, including their sense of having shared goals and 
identity - and ‘bridging’ social capital – which involves enhancing the quality of 
relationships across social boundaries and the benefit derived from those links (Putnam 
2000), for example between citizens and ‘external’ institutions such as implementers 
and regulators.31 This therefore goes well beyond the idea that it is essential to 
understand the social context of communication about risk and risk management and its 
effect on stakeholder concerns and priorities (Johnson 1987), an insight that has been 
acted upon by many organisations in the radioactive waste management sector over the 
past decade or more. Instead it looks to the ways that interventions and mechanisms 
introduced to address such concerns, and associated tensions or conflicts, may in turn 
have unintended but beneficial consequences, not only for the community but also 
potentially, through the production of a virtuous circle of positive outcomes and 
relationships, for the organisations and institutions involved. This is consistent with the 
‘added value’ model of community benefit advocated by the FSC, which goes beyond 
thinking simply in terms of financial benefits to look for ways of enhancing community 
well-being, and points to ways in which some form of participatory monitoring might 
contribute to achieving that goal (NEA 2007a). 
 
                                                        
30
 Several examples from outside the radioactive waste field are cited in the review by Conrad and Hilchey 
(2011). 
31
 Although even when citizen involvement in monitoring enhances the capacity of regulatory institutions, there 
may continue to be epistemic differences; that is, different understandings on the part of experts and non-experts 
about what constitutes evidence and proof (Ottinger 2009).  
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3.5.2 An Active Role for Stakeholders 
The preceding paragraphs identify some positive consequences of involving 
stakeholders in monitoring programmes. Although there are significant differences 
between the environmental monitoring that is the focus of most of the examples given 
and monitoring a geological repository, these examples demonstrate the potential value 
of stakeholder participation. However, the examples that have been discussed, although 
reflecting experience of monitoring programmes across different contexts and taking 
different forms, also suggest a number of other observations about lay stakeholders and 
monitoring, some of them cautionary in nature.  
 
The first observation is that, where there is perceived to be the potential for 
environmental contamination, however small the risk, in terms of technical expert 
assessments, that this might present to the natural environment and human health, 
environmental monitoring typically plays an important role in reassuring local citizens 
and stakeholder representatives of the safety of a facility. A second point of note is that 
where there is distrust of the competence or good faith of regulatory or other risk 
management organisations, and particularly where this is associated with a sense of 
injustice, citizens and stakeholder groups are likely to seek ways in which they can 
commission or conduct their own monitoring.32 A third, related point is that the 
evidence suggests that the active involvement of citizens in environmental monitoring 
can contribute to building and supporting public confidence – or at least to addressing 
mutually reinforcing experiences of distrust, vulnerability and powerlessness that can 
lead some citizens, or even whole communities, to adopt a stance of resentful or hostile 
resistance (Simmons and Walker 1999). The emphasis given here to stakeholders taking 
an active role should not be taken to suggest that individual citizens necessarily should – 
or would want to – be involved in collecting data, as in the case of the US bucket 
brigades, but institutional bodies established to represent the interests of affected 
citizens have, themselves, to build and maintain the confidence of the wider community. 
A comment made by the Mayor of Soulaine-Dhuys in France, who referred to the Aube 
CLI ‘waking from its torpor’ and gaining in credibility in the process, tells us implicitly 
that such bodies, particularly over time, may come to be seen as passive and ineffectual. 
                                                        
32
 This point was also raised in the course of the third UK workshop on monitoring and retrievability (UK CEED 
2002: 16). As another example, Canadian communities unhappy with the handling of wastes in the uranium 
mining region of Elliott Lake established a Standing Environmental Committee (SEC) in an effort to develop the 
capacity for monitoring and research that involved the community (MacDonald in NEA 2003: 107-111). Despite 
45 years of experience of mining in the area, there was a low level of confidence in the regulators and site 
operators. Although earlier community monitoring initiatives had been short-lived, the SEC aimed to reassert the 
role of the local community in a number of ways including organising conferences on waste management 
technologies, compiling a repository of waste management information, and calling for public visits to the sites 
to be reinstated. 
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A visibly active role for stakeholders’ representative bodies may therefore be important 
for confidence at all levels.  
 
3.5.3 Stakeholder Capacity to Participate 
Several of the studies of monitoring described in this section highlight the development 
of new capacities, including technical understanding and competencies, by citizens and 
community groups. They demonstrate therefore not only that some citizens and 
stakeholder groups may wish to become more directly involved in repository 
monitoring programmes, conceived in broad terms as the entire package of monitoring 
activities, but also that they are, in principle, capable of doing so.33 This is consistent 
with a conclusion that emerged from an FSC thematic session on the link between RD&D 
and stakeholder confidence: ‘Communities need to be informed and have the capacity to, 
should they wish, participate in monitoring as well as decision-making’ (NEA 2006: 26, 
emphasis added). Reporting on a 2007 symposium on the safety case, a member of the 
NEA’s Integration Group for the Safety Case Core Group was even more explicit than the 
2006 FSC report. He maintained that ‘a broad range of aspects of the safety case can be 
refined with the help of local stakeholders’ and that ‘local (host) communities [...] can 
develop technical capability with proper support’, going on to assert that ‘testing and 
monitoring programmes by local communities themselves can enhance confidence and 
trust in the project’ (Strömberg, in NEA 2008: 21, emphasis added).  
 
3.5.4 Institutional Control and Stakeholder Participation 
The evidence reviewed in this section does not support generalisations about the form 
that community engagement with monitoring activities might take or about stakeholder 
views on ‘post-closure’ monitoring, particularly given national differences in political 
culture and in attitudes towards and confidence in geological disposal (TNS Opinion & 
Social 2008).34 Nevertheless it does appear that, notwithstanding technical expert 
                                                        
33
 It is noteworthy from the examples identified here that universities and local higher education colleges often 
play an important role in community monitoring programmes, either by being delegated the responsibility of 
conducting the monitoring, as in the case of Carlsbad and the WIPP, or by acting as partner or technical adviser, 
as in several of the other cases (the role of universities in community monitoring is discussed explicitly by Savan 
et al 2003). This can be attributed to the greater trust that is often expressed by citizens in academic scientists 
than in other sources of information about technological risk (see, for example, TNS Opinion & Social 2008). 
34
 There may, of course, also be differences in the degree of emphasis or attention which has, to date, been given 
to the role of monitoring in different countries. It is notable, for example, that whereas some reports of FSC 
workshops contain many references to monitoring, this is particularly the case where monitoring is an explicit 
component of a repository programme, as in the French case, or has been a significant focus of stakeholder 
interest and activity, as in the Hungarian case. When workshops have been hosted in countries where monitoring 
does not feature so prominently, as in Germany or Sweden, there has been correspondingly little mention of 
monitoring in the report, despite the international attendance at these events. For example, the report of the 
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confidence in the robustness of geological repositories designed to achieve passive 
safety, many stakeholders expect institutional oversight and control to continue for an 
extended, if unspecified, period of time after operations have ceased and, in several 
countries at least, for stakeholders themselves to be involved in some way in monitoring 
activities and decision making (e.g. UK CEED 2000; NEA 2003; NEA 2010b). A recent 
statement published by the NEA’s Radioactive Waste Management Committee 
acknowledges that ‘adequate institutional control is an essential condition for assuring 
confidence in the safety of a national waste management undertaking’ and that, although 
this must be exercised by the safety regulator, ‘a measure of control may also be 
delegated to other parties’, noting that ‘shared control is viewed as important by regional 
and local stakeholders’ (NEA 2012a: 14, emphasis added). In support of this statement 
the NEA RWMC cites survey research conducted in the USA on public confidence in the 
safety management at nuclear power plants, which found that the single thing which 
citizens said would increase their trust would be that ‘an advisory board of local citizens 
and environmentalists is established to monitor the plant and is given legal authority to 
shut the plant down if they believe it to be unsafe.’ (Slovic 1993: 678, emphasis added). 
Notwithstanding the difference in the basis of nuclear power plant safety and that of a 
geological repository, the point here, one supported by several of the examples given 
above, is that it is not just involvement in monitoring that underwrites stakeholder 
confidence but also the assurance that the capacity exists to take action in response to 
any unexpected or adverse results and to ensure that there is effective control of the 
hazard. It is therefore important to sound a cautionary note on the conditions under 
which stakeholder involvement in monitoring may sustain confidence in a geological 
disposal facility.  
 
The problem is highlighted in a study by Noble and Birk (2011) who, following their 
study of community-based monitoring associated with uranium mining in 
Saskatchewan, question whether it had done anything more than bolster confidence and 
improve relations. Their study cautions that, in some cases at least, such activities may 
amount to no more than what they characterise as comfort monitoring, which is not 
integrated with institutional mechanisms for decision making and taking action and so 
may have no material impact.35 Many of the cases of participatory monitoring 
                                                                                                                                                                             
workshop held in Östhammar, Sweden in May 2011, entitled “actual implementation of a spent nuclear fuel 
repository in Sweden”, contains virtually no reference to monitoring. It is only during a discussion on ‘value 
added’ approaches to community development that an unattributed comment on the subject is made: 
“monitoring facilities which help people living in the area to feel safe and under control can be considered 
added value and at the same time, become a means for openness and transparency” (NEA 2012b: 24).  
35
 Noble and Birk’s use of the phrase ‘comfort monitoring’ points to the sense of public ‘reassurance’ as a 
potentially manipulative use of monitoring, something that NGO participants in a UK workshop on monitoring 
and retrievability were very concerned to discourage, as opposed to the more neutral notion of ‘assurance’ 
typically adopted in relation to expert uses of monitoring (UK CEED 2000). Although Noble and Birk’s 
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programmes at radioactive waste management and disposal facilities do not appear to 
have yet been studied with this question in mind, something that would require a 
longitudinal research design in order that the effects over time of such a programme 
could be evaluated. The evidence already indicates that, in the short-term at least, 
stakeholder participation in monitoring programmes may have the desired effect of 
reducing levels of stakeholder concern within community settings and reduce the 
likelihood of conflict with implementers or regulators; however, should it later become 
apparent to stakeholders that participation in a monitoring programme is 
inconsequential or ineffective then, past research would suggest, some at least may 
become cynical and distrustful of the organisations and institutions involved if they 
come to perceive the process as tokenism or manipulation. This is a useful reminder of 
the need for all parties to be explicit about roles and expectations, and equally for all 
concerned to maintain a suitably critical perspective on any claimed benefits of citizen 
participation. 
 
One important conclusion that can be drawn from the social science research and other 
reports reviewed in this section is that, when considering its potential contribution to 
building public confidence in the long-term safety of a geological disposal facility, 
repository monitoring needs to be set in the context of the overall monitoring 
programme. During the operational phase of a repository, at least, it seems likely that 
stakeholders will expect a comprehensive programme of monitoring that includes not 
only monitoring of repository system conditions and evolutions but also of 
environmental and socioeconomic conditions, changes in which might be attributable to 
the presence of a repository. Each of these different types of monitoring may be 
required by different agencies and subject to different regulations; some additional 
monitoring may be required by affected communities in order to provide transparency 
and, perhaps, assurance. It may be that overlapping requirements introduce redundancy 
into the monitoring system. It has been argued, for example by an expert stakeholder 
participant in a UK workshop on monitoring and retrievability (UK CEED, 2000), that 
environmental monitoring for the presence of radionuclides was unnecessary as direct 
monitoring of repository processes would identify any failure of containment long 
before radionuclides migrated into wider environmental systems; nevertheless, a 
certain amount of redundancy may be called for not only to meet different regulatory 
requirements but also community stakeholder requirements. Given the examples 
outlined above of local stakeholders insisting on conducting monitoring activity 
                                                                                                                                                                             
observations are based on a single case study, Conrad and Hilchey (2011) note that many groups participating in 
environmental monitoring projects found that their data were not actually used. The problem of tokenism has 
been recognised – and criticised – in the field of participation research at least as far back as the seminal paper 
by Arnstein (1969). 
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independent of that conducted by site operators and regulators, it is conceivable that in 
some contexts affected stakeholders may have monitoring requirements additional to 
those of regulators. They may find it reassuring that there is not only what has been 
referred to as ‘defence in depth’ in the form of a multi-barrier repository design but also 
what might be termed ‘surveillance in depth’, where not only sensor redundancy but 
also multiple parameter monitoring ensure as much useful information as possible on 
barrier performance and on the performance of the repository system. The implications 
of the themes of sustained surveillance – or vigilance –, trust and transparency that have 
been outlined in this concluding part of Section 3 are discussed further in Section 4 of 
the report.  
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4   Monitoring: a Combined Technical and 
Social Activity 
This section reflects on the technical and social aspects of monitoring and on the issues 
the authors think are important if monitoring is to become an instrument that can 
effectively contribute to assuring all parties concerned of the safety and reliable 
performance of a deep geological repository. 
 
From the interactions we had with technical experts (see Section2), it became clear that 
the expert community recognises that monitoring has both technical and social 
purposes. While there are strong technical reasons why one should monitor a geological 
repository (e.g. monitoring of disturbances in the host rock during excavation; or 
monitoring the lining of access galleries in the period before closure in repositories in 
salt or indurated clay geologies), questions of evidence, confidence and decision-making 
always have, to a greater or lesser extent, a social component. In what follows we try to 
unravel some of these socio-technical entanglements and the issues that they raise. 
 
In Section 4.1, we do this by looking at the close link between monitoring and safety, as 
monitoring is considered a key factor in providing confirmation about the safe 
performance of the repository system. The experts tend to focus here on the operational 
and pre-closure stages. However, as some of the examples in Section 3 indicate, 
concerned citizens and decision-makers may look at things from a different perspective 
and wonder how one can ever be sure that passive safety is guaranteed without some 
continuous form of monitoring? We will consider this challenge by looking at monitoring 
as vigilance. 
 
But safety is not only about getting the numbers right. As Section 3 demonstrates, it is 
also about interpreting what the numbers mean, and about being able to put trust in, or 
at least have the ability to exercise some form of control over, those providing and those 
interpreting the numbers. Therefore in Section 4.2 we address the question of trust in 
relation to the practical organisation of monitoring.  
 
Subsequently in Section 4.3 we examine how this affects roles and responsibilities in 
monitoring, and the question of what to do with the data and how to interpret results. 
We reflect on these issues in relation to the potential for monitoring to contribute to 
transparency. Finally, in Section 4.4 we draw conclusions on the implications this has for 
the potential of monitoring to contribute to building public confidence in a repository 
system. 
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4.1 Monitoring as Vigilance 
Essentially, geological disposal and the concept of passive safety envision the permanent 
isolation of radioactive waste from society: its placement outside of the biosphere in 
perpetuity. This has often been criticised as the adoption of an ‘out of sight and out of 
mind’ mentality, with the underlying concern being that a lack of oversight after closure 
would result in any unanticipated threats to safety that might subsequently develop 
going unobserved and unchecked. Choosing not to maintain societal memory of the 
location of a repository (i.e. permanently locking the waste away and then ‘throwing 
away the key’) rather than continuing to remind ourselves of the buried presence of 
radioactive waste could be one way of reducing the likelihood of future human intrusion 
(see, for an example, Barthe 2009: 124). However, the prevailing paradigm would seem 
to be one of keeping alive the memory of the location and harmful nature of waste 
repositories, in order to deter future generations from inadvertently breaching the 
containment through mining or other activities. 36 This approach has been strengthened 
by even greater concern with monitoring and safeguarding nuclear materials by safety 
authorities and international organisations such as the IAEA amid heightened fears of 
global terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11. Furthermore, both in specific national policy 
contexts and in international fora such as the NEA, we see the question of 
retrievability/reversibility in waste repositories receiving sustained attention, together 
with a growing awareness that, even in countries where retrievability or reversibility 
are not part of official policy, implementing geological disposal is something that will 
imply several decades of emplacement activity, during which nuclear materials may be 
relatively accessible. 
  
Geological disposal should therefore not be characterised as a process of institutional 
forgetting, but could be compared to the establishment and maintenance of a high 
security prison, from which no inmate is ever expected to be set free again. Monitoring is 
in this respect important in view of a constant need for staying alert, of providing checks 
and balances, but also of assessing risks and providing some guidance in case 
unexpected things do happen. In other words, monitoring can be seen as the effective 
means to put a guiding principle of vigilance into practice. Again, we refer here to 
monitoring in a broader sense (see Section 3), not restricted to monitoring repository 
                                                        
36
 The social and institutional arrangements required to support this have been the focus of research in the USA 
and elsewhere for more than two decades (e.g. Hora et al 1991; Hora and Von Winterfeldt, 1997). More 
generally, this is expressed not only in institutional arrangements but also in the intuitive responses of ordinary 
citizens to the concept of phased geological disposal, as the following observation from the report of a focus 
group study of the attitudes of British citizens illustrates: ‘Most respondents were disturbed by the idea that there 
would ever be an end to human management. They argued that monitoring should continue for as long as the 
waste exists’ (Future Foundation 2002: 16). 
   MoDeRn 
D-1.3.1_Final_30-10-2012 
56 
and near field processes, which is the focus of the technical research in the MoDeRn 
project. 
  
In this section, we look at how monitoring as the pursuit of vigilance, of continuous 
awareness of the presence of radioactive material, even if several hundred meters below 
the surface, is an important element in thinking about nuclear safety. 
 
4.1.1 Weinberg’s Vision of Nuclear Safety as Vigilance 
The idea of vigilance as a leading principle for nuclear safety is not new, and has long 
since had advocates within the nuclear expert community. A famous principled vision, 
outlining the challenge of the safe disposal of radioactive waste and how it should be 
addressed, was provided by the nuclear scientist Alvin Weinberg. This vision referred to 
a need for both technical and institutional innovation. Writing at the beginning of the 
1970s, at a time when public concerns over radioactive waste, and nuclear safety more 
generally, were becoming more widespread, Weinberg identified a ‘Faustian bargain’ as 
having been struck between the nuclear sector and society at large (Weinberg 
1971/1992). What he and others saw as a cheap abundant new source of energy came at 
a price: the unusual degree of vigilance which of necessity had to be exercised over all 
programmes of nuclear power generation during the entire course of their development 
in order to guarantee safety (Weinberg 1971/1992: 234).  
 
Somewhat misleadingly Weinberg, writing during the Cold War years, drew a direct 
parallel between the vigilance required to protect peaceful nuclear energy and that 
already exercised by what he characterises as a ‘military priesthood’ in order to protect 
against an inadvertent use of nuclear weapons that might precipitate nuclear war. This 
made it easy to associate the ‘eternal vigilance’ of which Weinberg spoke with a small 
elite cadre wrapped in secrecy, and hidden away from society at large. While the 
formation of such an isolated and publicly invisible ‘priesthood’ has been stronger in 
relation to the monitoring of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, it has arguably 
never been an appropriate option for exercising vigilance over peaceful nuclear energy: 
the military origins of civilian nuclear development have coloured perceptions of its 
legitimacy and to some extent continue to do so to this day.  
 
Towards the end of his life Weinberg was at pains to point out that his notion of a 
‘Faustian bargain’ had often been misunderstood (Spreng, Marland and Weinberg 2007). 
What was distinctive about the type of vigilance he had in mind, was its constant and 
tireless nature, not its elitist and backroom character. The very survival of the nuclear 
sector should in this respect be understood as perpetually on the line in its tireless, 
unceasing and painstaking efforts to maintain nuclear safety. Extending this vision to 
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reflect the specific characteristics of nuclear materials, Weinberg also emphasized the 
exceptional longevity of vigilance that he saw as being necessary to guarantee safety.37  
 
Already in 1971, he could identify ‘two basically different approaches’ to the the safe 
disposal of radioactive waste: permanent above-ground storage versus geological 
disposal. These two approaches entail very different commitments – and underlying 
‘philosophies’ – which continue to be debated by stakeholders today and have a bearing 
on the MoDeRn project. Above-ground storage of wastes in ‘concrete vaults’, Weinberg 
(1971/1992: 234) proposes, calls for an enduring technological ‘priesthood’ to monitor 
and, as necessary, to manage the wastes and the facility.38 The relative advantage of 
geological disposal in Weinberg’s eyes was, therefore, the progressive relaxation of 
monitoring demands it appears to allow for as a more complete isolation of the waste 
from the biosphere is secured. Nevertheless, he still saw a residual amount of 
surveillance being required ‘in perpetuity’ to prevent human intrusion into the facility.39  
 
4.1.2 Monitoring as an Enactment of Vigilance 
By defining vigilance as the first principle of nuclear safety, Weinberg provided the field 
with not only a sense of purpose, but also a moral form. Nuclear safety obliges society to 
be tireless, and always alert to possible danger. This is particularly the case for nuclear 
installations such as power plants, fuel production or reprocessing plants, and storage 
facilities. Deep geological repositories may be in that respect distinct from other nuclear 
activities, as their goal of establishing a state of inherently passive safety can be 
understood as a way of trying to renegotiate the need for ‘eternal’ vigilance. But in so far 
as this holds (and this is at the heart of the debate today), it can only be argued for the 
situation after closure. Throughout the operational phase (including any extended pre-
closure phases), the situation remains more comparable to other nuclear facilities.  
 
Staying alert and vigilant calls for the continuing refinement of powers of observation. 
Etymologically speaking, vigilance and monitoring point to common concerns. Monitor 
derives from the Latin monere ‘to remind, warn’ and is closely associated with admonere 
                                                        
37
 For other reflections upon the implications of the long-term relationship between stakeholders who host a 
disposal facility and the waste, see O’Connor (2003) and Pescatore and Mays (2008). 
38
 This notion of a ‘priesthood’, as a cadre maintained over the generations to ensure persistence of institutional 
and societal memory and the necessary expertise, was also espoused by Thomas A Sebeok in a report 
commissioned by the US Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation (Sebeok 1984). 
39
 Weinberg’s reference to a time span that was ‘in perpetuity’ seems never to have been made very explicit but 
his references to civilizational timescales indicates a duration that far exceeds generational or even historical 
human timescales, being related to the persistence over millennia of the hazard presented by some radionuclides. 
Weinberg’s phrase may be in that sense seen as a rhetorical device, intended to convey the burden of 
responsibility to which he was alluding.  
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‘to warn earnestly’, or ‘to reprimand’. Therefore, monitoring has never simply been a 
matter of measuring or verifying things, it has always implied a concern with the 
maintenance and enforcement of proper order. The original monitors, dating back to the 
1540s, were senior pupils at schools entrusted with maintaining discipline. This implied 
a delegation of authority to some pupils in order to gain the compliance of others. In 
more recent times, a monitor has also come to refer to a technical device used to 
measure the performance of other technical devices. In another evolution of the usage of 
the word, a monitor has also come to mean a technology for producing new forms of 
visibility: for example, the device that displays the picture from a CCTV camera, from 
industrial ultrasound equipment or from a magnetic resonance imaging device that 
makes the interior workings of the human body visible. In this way monitoring has 
become associated with the production of transparency, and of faithful accounts or 
mirrors, of behaviour and action. We must however keep in mind that monitoring is not 
just about showing reality as it is. It is also about interpreting collected data and giving 
meaning to these results, and hence about a process or action of producing reality. 
 
With respect to geological repositories, this role of monitoring as an enactment of 
vigilance is most pertinent when addressing monitoring for operational safety (for 
example, radiological monitoring for the health of workers or monitoring the structural 
integrity of ground support) and environmental impact (for example, monitoring 
groundwater quality, air, soils, or fauna and flora for any evidence of environmental 
impacts). Monitoring with respect to operational safety, is in first instance about 
questioning safety: Have all necessary measures been taken to protect the workforce? 
What impact will the introduction of new emplacement techniques have on 
underground working conditions? Here the appreciation of what monitoring can and 
should contribute is not likely to vary too largely between experts and lay-stakeholders, 
in particular concerned local citizens.  
 
Where long-term safety is concerned, the link between active monitoring (particularly in 
the near field) and the need to remain vigilant may become a bit more relaxed. From a 
technical specialist’s point of view the focus of monitoring for long-term safety during 
the operational and, more particularly, the pre-closure phase is on confirming safety, 
rather than questioning safety: Can monitoring results support the technical and 
scientific basis used to evaluate long-term safety and the transition to passive safety? 
Can monitoring reduce uncertainty and confirm or even enhance the knowledge base? 
‘Eternal’ vigilance in regard to a closed and passive geological repository is from a 
technical expert perspective about ensuring that the facility remains isolated from 
humanity and its environment, and deterring human intrusion. Monitoring as an 
expression of vigilance in a post-closure phase is mainly about observing changes in the 
repository environment and considering possible effects these may cause on the 
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repository function. Despite the detailed catalogue of features, events and processes 
considered in the design and performance assessment of a repository system, there was 
acceptance among the experts that we interviewed that it is not possible to plan for all 
contingencies, although they tended to focus on contingencies external to the system. 
When considering the post-closure phase and the safety case there was less 
consideration given in the interviews to unanticipated contingencies within the 
repository system.40   
 
However, for those in society who may have less faith in modelling and statistical 
predictions of long-term repository behaviour, remaining vigilant both before and after 
closure of the repository is likely to mean something slightly different: making sure at all 
times that the repository will not have any effect on its natural and social environment, 
and maintaining preparedness in case the unexpected should happen.41 Such an 
interpretation of vigilance would seem to be more in line with a view of monitoring in 
terms of ‘checks and balances’ that question, or at least critically assess safety. 
4.2 Putting trust in a monitoring system 
For monitoring to be able to contribute to a better public understanding of and greater 
confidence in the repository system, a relatively high amount of trust in the monitoring 
system will first and foremost be required. 
 
In the following paragraphs, we will explore why there is a problem of trust as regards 
to geological repositories (4.2.1), what exactly we mean by the notion of ‘trust’ (4.2.2), 
and how general insights into trust relations between experts and lay people contribute 
to our understanding of trust in relation to monitoring systems (4.2.3). In this section 
we will focus on monitoring in view of long-term safety: firstly because that is the 
primary objective of other research activity in the MoDeRn, and secondly because we 
see that aspect to be the most troublesome when it comes to addressing different 
stakeholders’ expectations and establishing relations of trust. 
                                                        
40
 This may have been due to the focus of the interviews as, in addition to their work within the MoDeRn project, 
some of these experts had previously participated in projects that were working on the safety case, such as the 
European Commission’s PAMINA project.  
41
 This conjecture draws both on the research on risk and trust and on the evidence outlined in Section 3 of this 
report, which makes clear that in many situations stakeholders require not only operator and technical expert 
assurances of safety but the additional reassurance of (independent) monitoring for any evidence of exposure to 
harmful releases. In the case of geological disposal, of course, it is expected that nothing will be released and 
therefore no changes could be observed for tens of millennia, which could well mean that future generations of 
stakeholders decide to abandon the practice within the two to three centuries or so for which post-closure 
monitoring is currently anticipated in those countries where it is being proposed. Nevertheless, in the first 
instance it seems reasonable to anticipate this as a likely stakeholder expectation and requirement.  
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4.2.1 A Geological Disposal Facility = an Environmental Risk 
Dealing with radioactive waste is undeniably a hazardous activity. If not, we wouldn’t 
have to go through the trouble of protecting man and the environment from it. The risk 
of possible contamination is obviously higher when the waste or waste containers are 
being handled. That risk will be far lower as long as the waste is isolated and contained 
without anyone coming near it. The whole concept of geological disposal is based on the 
idea of isolating the waste from the biosphere for as long as possible. However, it is clear 
that no engineered barrier will last long enough to prevent the radiation from ‘leaking 
out’ at some point in time. Therefore the concept of geological disposal is based on 
multiple engineered and natural or geological barriers, where different barriers work 
together in combination. The expert community is convinced that this is the best way of 
guaranteeing that radio toxicity levels will have decreased enough before any 
radionuclides escaping a geological repository would ever come in contact with the 
biosphere. Experts base their judgement on scientific knowledge drawn from research 
and on experience generated through expert systems.  
 
However, concerned citizens, the public and public decision-makers may not share this 
conviction. From their point of view a geological disposal facility is considered a 
potential environmental risk. This we also see reflected in environmental legislation: e.g. 
Annexe I of the EIA directive42 explicitly lists ‘Installations designed for the final disposal 
of radioactive waste and irradiated nuclear fuel’ as projects that must as a rule be subject 
to systematic assessment because of their significant effects on the environment. 
Compliance monitoring for environmental impact assessment will in this regard be 
important. But will this be enough? One of the multiple reasons why there tends to be a 
demand from society for some form of reversibility, or at least flexibility, in the concept 
of geological disposal, is that people value the existence of a ‘Plan B’ in case anything 
goes wrong. The public may therefore not be as confident that with today’s knowledge, 
experts can fully understand and control long term repository behaviour.  
 
These doubts have many origins, but are at least partially based on evidence from 
known cases of disastrous sociotechnical failures (Irwin 200143; Jasanoff 1994; Perrow 
1984). The accidents at the Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima-Daichi nuclear 
power stations have added to the stock of negative cultural imagery that in popular 
culture is often associated with nuclear technologies. Weart (2012) has characterised 
this as contributing to ‘nuclear fear’, while other researchers have pointed to the 
                                                        
42
 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private 
projects on the environment  - 85/337/EEC - OJ L 175, 5.7.1985, p. 40. 
43
 “… public groups can be expected to bring more than blank sheets of paper to environmental debate: 
memories of previous incidents, moral judgements and forms of local knowledge can all play a part in local 
understandings of environmental issues and in the very construction of those ‘issues’.” (Irwin 2001: 96) 
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stigmatised nature of nuclear technology in popular culture (e.g. Flynn 2003). However, 
although the work of Weart and others usefully draws attention to the potential 
influence of nuclear imagery, an emphasis on emotional response fails to recognise the 
ways that people draw on evidence of failures of expertise, of technological systems, and 
of regulatory and organisational risk management to make judgements about 
assurances of safety with which they are being presented (e.g. Freudenburg 1993). 
These events are often presented by the industry as being in important ways 
‘exceptions’ but each in its way provides evidence not only of the ‘man-made’ nature of 
technological disasters but also of the complex sociotechnical conditions that have led 
some analysts to talk of ‘normal accidents’ (Turner and Pidgeon 1997; Perrow 1999). 
They have therefore come to represent the capacity for catastrophic failure, even in 
what are typically presented as high-reliability organisations and industries, so it is 
perhaps unsurprising that we find these events, although related to the operation of 
nuclear power plants, being used as analogies and reasons for caution when radioactive 
waste management is being discussed with members of the lay public (e.g. Hunt and 
Simmons 2001).  
 
Similarly, the case of the German Asse Mine, where the inflow of brine has raised 
concerns about possible flooding and collapse of the salt, and consequently the safety of 
the LILW stored there, is likely to have a negative impact on how some citizens and 
stakeholder groups perceive geological disposal. Even if there are good explanations for 
the problems at Asse and why this could never happen in a real geological disposal 
facility, those concerned may not necessarily trust this message. The fact that the 
problems at Asse have been attributed as much to political-administrative factors as to 
the geotechnical problem that resulted in water flowing into the mine highlights the 
interplay of social and technical elements in producing a public issue. Furthermore it is 
not only risks due to negligence that gives rise to public discomfort about the safety of 
repository facilities. What concerns many people as much as, if not more, than the fact 
that there remain risks due to the impossibility of foreseeing all contingencies, is when 
uncertainties are not publicly acknowledged. Expert statements on repository safety 
that do not acknowledge the remaining uncertainties may therefore not be perceived as 
trustworthy (Irwin 2008). 
 
4.2.2 Trust Relations between Experts and Lay Citizens 
The risks of radioactive waste are an example of a type of risk that has emerged in the 
modern industrial period. They are characterised by German sociologist Ulrich Beck 
(1992; 1995) as being: (a) undetectable to our physical senses and therefore only 
discernible through technical instruments and scientific judgement; (b) not limited in 
their effects by time, space or social differences; (c) the result of human intervention in 
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nature, and thus attributable to decision-making; and (d), because of their complexity, 
not to be grasped by the usual rules of causality and liability, and therefore not 
amenable to risk management mechanisms such as insurance. Although one might take 
issue with some of the detail of Beck’s characterisation, a first point to note here is that, 
being unable to rely on sensory data to evaluate risk, citizens are placed in a relationship 
of dependency on experts and expert systems (Giddens 1990; 1991); a dependency that, 
as discussed below, makes trust both extremely important and at the same time 
contingent upon other aspects of those relationships. A second point to note is that this 
is compounded by what Giddens (1994) has referred to as the problem of ‘manufactured 
uncertainty’: the more knowledgeable we are about the social and natural world, the 
more their complexity is revealed. While on the one hand this offers us both individually 
and collectively more opportunities and possible options for the future, on the other 
hand it makes us more aware of the risk potential and the uncertainties involved when 
choosing one option over another: ‘there are no longer clear paths of development 
leading from one state of affairs to another’ (Giddens 1994: 185). The increasing 
complexity of society and of our systems of knowledge has led to an increased division 
of labour and hence to greater dependency on technical experts to identify and assess 
environmental and technological risks for the benefit of the broader society. This comes 
at the cost of a substantial increase in the vulnerability of ‘the very interdependencies 
that also make the system work’ (Freudenberg 1993: 914). 
 
It is here that the problem for science and technology occurs: as many commentators 
have noted, when it enters the public and political spheres, science often faces 
challenges to its credibility and public authority, with the public trust in scientists and in 
expertise that is often recorded in relation to ‘science-in-general’ becoming more critical 
when contextualised in the particularities of specific sociotechnical issues.44 This can be 
attributed to an on-going pluralisation of technical and scientific knowledge claims and 
increasing lay awareness that science is always value laden and rarely offers unanimous 
estimations or judgements (Ali 1997). This quality can in turn lead to science becoming 
politicised in public controversies and being used as a ‘weapon’ by protagonists in such 
disputes (Eyerman and Jamison 1989; Beck 1992). As a consequence, it has been argued, 
scientific knowledge is losing its ‘nimbus of objectivity, of social neutrality and of 
reliability’ and in itself becomes a source of uncertainty (Lau 1992: 243). In today’s 
society, science is no longer [seen as] a more legitimate activity than many other social 
activities (Lidskog 1996). In spite of this, on a general level, science may still have social 
authority, and scientific knowledge still is generally perceived as having some 
predominance over other forms of knowledge (Lidskog 1996). Opponents against 
geological disposal for example reproach waste managers and decision-makers for 
letting other than scientific criteria prevail in the process of site selection (e.g. Wallace 
                                                        
44
 For a discussion of this distinction in relation to lay understandings of science, see Michael (1992). 
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2010). Empirical research has furthermore shown that it is not the knowledge or science 
as such that is trusted or distrusted, but the institutions that produce them (e.g. 
Wildavsky and Dake 1990).45  
 
4.2.3 Conceptualising Trust, Trusting Institutions 
Before addressing further the how this affects (or could affect) the issue of geological 
disposal and how that links up to monitoring, we need to look more closely at the 
concept of trust itself. Trust is an essential component of any enduring social 
relationship: ‘without trust, the everyday social life which we take for granted is simply 
not possible’ (Good 2000: 32). One reason for this may be that it performs the social 
function of reducing the burden imposed upon us by complexity, enabling us to take 
some things as given (Luhmann 1979). However, another aspect of contemporary 
existence is our awareness today that society is formed by human agency. Since we have 
little control of other people’s actions we cannot have full control over our social 
environment; we therefore need to rely on trust (Giddens 1990; 1991). Trusting in that 
respect then becomes ‘the crucial strategy for dealing with an uncertain and 
uncontrollable future’ (Sztompka 1999: 25). 
 
Trust is in essence something we vest in people, not in natural objects or events: ‘Even if 
we seemingly confer trust on objects, […] we in fact refer to humanly created systems 
and indirectly we trust the designers, producers, and operators whose ingenuity and 
labour are somehow encrypted in the objects.’ (Sztompka 1999: 20) 46. When we put 
trust in people, we normally do not ask questions – trust is about not worrying and not 
asking questions. When we start asking questions, trust has to be repaired by the 
                                                        
45
 It is instructive to note that although ‘scientists’ were found by the 2008 Eurobarometer survey on public 
attitudes to radioactive waste to enjoy, along with environmental NGOs, the highest level of trust as a source of 
information (38 and 39% respectively), the questionnaire makes no distinction between scientists employed by 
different organisations and institutions, and that only 11% of the sample expressed trust in the nuclear industry 
(TNS Opinion & Social 2008). Research on other sociotechnical issues has repeatedly found that organisational 
setting can make a significant difference to public evaluations of trustworthiness, with ‘university scientists’ 
typically more trusted than those working in business organisations (e.g. Worcester 1999; Critchley 2008). 
46
 Luhmann (2000) makes a further distinction between confidence and trust, noting that although both refer to 
expectations, confidence relates to situations where we do not consider the possibility of our expectations being 
disappointed, whereas trust always involves an awareness of the risk that those expectations may be disappointed 
as a result of the actions, or inaction, of others. This suggests that although the term ‘confidence’ is widely used 
when talking about the relationship of societal stakeholders to radioactive waste management, by this definition 
the word ‘trust’ is more appropriate. Although much of what has been written about trust concerns interpersonal 
trust, Sztompka argues that social trust is not fundamentally different. It is about putting trust in social roles, 
social groups, institutions, procedures, systems. But all these different types of trust operate according to the 
same logic and build on trust in people and their actions: ‘We ultimately trust human actions, and derivatively 
their effects, or products.’ (Sztompka 1999: 46).  
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answers given to these questions. And such questions can always arise and in every 
social setting. In this respect trust is never a given: to start asking questions means to 
start calculating about the future.47 
 
Therefore Sztompka (1999: 25-26) defines trust as ‘a bet about the future contingent 
actions of others’, involving specific expectations about how other persons will behave 
on a future occasion, and a form of commitment through action – the placing of the bet.48 
This commitment can be stronger or weaker, depending on the circumstances. 
Sztompka (1999: 28-29) identifies six kinds of circumstances that may impact a 
commitment of trust: 
1) the consequences involved;  
2) the expected duration of the trust relationship; 
3) the (ir)revocability of the decision to place trust in someone; 
4) the amount of risk involved, defined by the scope of possible losses in case of a 
breach of trust; 
5) the presence or absence of insurance or other back-up arrangements against 
losses; 
6) the value of the ‘object’ entrusted. 
 
Trust is thus strongly linked to the notion of risk, and in particular risks evoked by 
human action. This is because we can define risk as the uncertainty about the future in 
terms of potential loss as a consequence, or perceived consequence, of a decision 
(Luhmann 1993). Being attributable to a decision (or to the lack of a decision) and thus 
to human action, is what distinguishes risk from danger. The notion of danger also refers 
to uncertainty about the future and potential loss, but without it being attributable to 
human action.  
 
In the case of a geological repository we are clearly talking about a situation of risk, in 
which any uncertainty related to the future behaviour of the repository system (whether 
induced by human action, or natural phenomena) will be attributed to the very decision 
of building the repository in that particular way in that particular place. Implementing 
                                                        
47
 Under these conditions, trust itself is always provisional and contingent upon a potentially changing context, a 
condition which has been characterised, with some differences of interpretation, as ‘sceptical trust’ (Lewis and 
Weigert 1985), ‘active trust’ (Giddens 1991), ‘conditional trust’ (Jones and George 1998), or ‘critical trust’ 
(Walls et al 2004). It may in fact be more appropriate in many circumstances involving risk and government 
institutions or private organisations to think not in terms of securing trust but rather of a suspension of distrust 
that nevertheless maintains a healthy scepticism (Cook and Gronke 2005; see also Barber 1983). 
48
 Sztompka’s formulation of trust as a ‘bet’ therefore resonates with Weinberg’s ‘wager’ (see also Section 4.3) 
in that the requirement implicit in Weinberg’s vision is that, in a classic principal-agent problem, those delegated 
by society, his ‘priesthood’ institutionalising knowledge and expertise, with the task of exercising vigilance be 
trusted by those whose interests they represent.  
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geological disposal furthermore demands an extremely strong commitment of trust by 
those (potentially) affected by it, as for each of the six influencing ‘circumstances’ 
described by Sztompka, the impact (whether ‘real’ or ‘perceived’) is vast. Committing to 
host a high level waste repository is indeed not without consequences and implies more 
than a lifelong commitment. Given the characteristics of the waste involved, the stakes 
remain undeniably high and even if experts consider it highly improbable that 
something will go wrong, the possible impact if it should is difficult to foresee. As a 
consequence of this and of the time frames involved, no real contingency plans exist, and 
the possibility to withdraw from the commitment once the repository becomes 
operational diminishes considerably. 49 Last, but not least, the ‘object’ that is entrusted 
in making such a commitment is human life itself, something that, notwithstanding the 
valuations of insurers and economists, is considered by many people to be priceless50. 
The notion of reversibility can in this respect be seen as a way to soften the 
commitment, offering some form of insurance and suggesting a possibility of 
revocability, thereby rendering the commitment less final. 
 
An additional complication here is that in the modern world individuals find themselves 
in all areas of their lives in asymmetric power relationships with organisations and 
institutions (and, one might add, systems of expertise) which are the locus of key 
decisions that affect them (Coleman 1982). This is an unavoidable outcome of the social 
division of labour that results from increased specialisation and differentiation in 
complex societies. For individuals to trust such entities involves a different type of 
relation and different forms of assurance to those which obtain in their personal 
relations with other individuals; in other words a form of ‘impersonal’ trust (Shapiro 
1987). One basis upon which such trust in the motivations and actions of organisational 
actors may be established is by putting in place formal institutional mechanisms, be they 
mandatory or voluntary, that provide assurances, checks and sanctions which increase 
the likelihood that those actions will meet societal (and individual) expectations (Zucker 
1986; Simmons and Wynne 1993). We can see the organisational changes made by 
many radioactive waste management agencies over the past decade or so as attempts to 
institute such mechanisms and thereby not only to establish but to present to 
stakeholders such trustworthy characteristics as transparency and openness, qualities 
that were notably lacking throughout the nuclear industry in earlier decades (NEA 
2007c).  
                                                        
49
 Something which for many raises concerns about problems resulting from technological inflexibility and the 
irreversibility of decision-making commitments that have so often been associated with complex, large-scale 
infrastructural projects (Collingridge 1992; also Flyvbjerg et al 2003 for other problems). 
50
 Sztompka himself considers the sixth circumstance a specific one, in which a particular object (for example, a 
child) is given into the care of another person or persons (Sztompka 1999: 29). This entrusting of ‘an object’ into 
someone’s care may also be of a more symbolic nature, however, where the ‘object’ is not yet present, as is the 
case with future generations who might be affected by any failure of a geological repository. 
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This excursus on institutional mechanisms for building trust is therefore of specific 
importance if we want to understand the extent to which monitoring and the 
information that it produces could influence the public’s confidence in a geological 
repository system. Trust in a monitoring system is not only, and perhaps not even 
primarily, to do with the results it produces: it is to a large degree related to how the 
monitoring system is set up and operated, and by whom. 
4.3 Institutional Context: Roles, Responsibilities and Transparency 
This leads us to the question of who plays which role with regard to monitoring and how 
monitoring results are interpreted and presented. For a good understanding, we focus 
here on the organisation of monitoring itself, as the question we want to address is how 
monitoring can contribute to building and maintaining confidence in a repository 
system. However, trust and confidence in the repository system as a long-term solution 
for managing radioactive waste, have many other influencing factors. In this section, we 
consider only those issues relating directly to monitoring within the context of 
geological disposal. 
 
Returning to Weinberg and his concept of vigilance, it can be argued that, in retrospect, 
the most interesting ambiguity remaining in his notion of a Faustian bargain or wager51 
is the question of who is cast in which role? As already implied, it might appear as if it 
is the nuclear sector which is making the wager that they can be relied upon to uphold 
their safety vigil for as long as needed, come what may. On the other hand, as pointed 
out by Berman (1983: 85), this may constitute a serious misreading of Weinberg’s 
vision. Rather, he can be interpreted as affirming that it is society that is cast in the role 
of Faust, and the nuclear sector as Mephistopheles. It is society at large that is being 
lured by the beguiling bounties of nuclear energy, and that must assume ultimate 
responsibility for guaranteeing the existence of the ‘eternal vigilance’ upon which 
                                                        
51
 In one of his last publications, Weinberg and his colleagues return to the original text by Goethe to clarify that 
it is actually a ‘Faustian wager’, rather than a ‘bargain’, that best captures the nature of the professional ethos 
they wish to establish as the foundation of nuclear safety. Re-reading Goethe, they note how Mephistopheles is 
convinced that if he renders life on Earth sufficiently easy, then the virtuous Faust will grow careless and 
slothful. In response, Faust wagers:  
If e’er upon my couch, stretched at my ease, I’m found, 
Then may my life that instant cease! 
Me canst thou cheat with glozing wile 
Till self-reproach away I cast, - 
Me with joy’s lure canst thou beguile 
Let that day be for me the last! 
Be this our wager! 
(quoted in Spreng, Marland and Weinberg 2007: 852) 
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nuclear safety is founded. Supporting such an interpretation we find Weinberg 
connecting the institutionalisation of sufficient vigilance with two demands.  
 
The first demand is that society be constant in its support of the skills and competences 
required to maintain vigilance: 
“Quality assurance is the phrase that permeates much of the nuclear community these days. It connotes 
using the highest standards of engineering design and execution; of maintaining proper discipline in the 
operation of nuclear plants in the face of the natural tendency to relax as a plant becomes older and more 
familiar…in short, of creating a continuing tradition of meticulous attention to detail.”  
 (Weinberg 1971/1992: 235) 
The second demand, however, is not so clear-cut. This is because Weinberg is not willing 
to specify it himself, but only to identify the need for its specification: How much 
vigilance is enough vigilance and how should it be organized? According to 
Weinberg, this was not for nuclear people alone to decide. It was something that society 
at large had to be active in determining:  
“We claim to be responsible technologists, and as responsible technologists we give as our judgement that 
these probabilities [of serious accident] are extremely – almost vanishingly – small: but we can never 
represent these things as certainties. The society must then make the choice, and this is a choice that we 
nuclear people cannot dictate. We can only participate in making it.”    
 (Weinberg 1971/1992: 236) 
The introduction of a requirement for retrievability in Swiss law on radioactive waste 
disposal52 and for reversibility in French law53, in each case putting a specific time frame 
on it, are examples of society deciding how much vigilance it expects. Experts, the 
‘responsible technologists’ Weinberg refers to, are now expected to make suggestions on 
how to organise such vigilance (among others through an adapted monitoring 
programme). In France, these suggestions will subsequently be put to a public debate, 
before the public authorities will take a decision on the practical implementation of the 
principle of reversibility54. 
  
Monitoring, it would seem, could play an important role in aiding society to make 
decisions on how much vigilance is deemed enough. It is a means of verifying if 
implementers are indeed achieving the statutory safety levels they are aiming for. So 
who then should have the responsibility to organise a monitoring programme? 
 
                                                        
52
 Nuclear Energy Act of 21 March 2003 (Kernergiegesetz, vom 21. März  2003). 
53
 Radioactive Materials and Waste Planing Act of 28 June 2006 (Loi n°2006-739 du 28 juin 2006 de 
programme relative à la gestion durable de matières et déchets radioactifs). 
54
 National plan on management of radioactive materials and waste 2010-2012 (Le Plan national de gestion des 
matières et des déchets radioactifs  - PNGMDR) : http://www.asn.fr/index.php/S-informer/Dossiers/La-gestion-
des-dechets-radioactifs/Le-cadre-reglementaire/Le-Plan-national-de-gestion-des-matieres-et-des-dechets-
radioactifs-PNGMDR 
   MoDeRn 
D-1.3.1_Final_30-10-2012 
68 
4.3.1 Who Should Act as Monitor? 
There seems to be a general assumption that it is the responsibility of the implementer 
or responsible radioactive waste management agency to provide a monitoring 
programme for its repository facility. Such a programme provides implementers with a 
tool for continuous learning and an indication of how they manage the steps between 
the start of construction and final repository closure. At the same time, it helps them to 
demonstrate they have their repositories under control.  
 
Monitoring has therefore both an inward-directed expert role and outward-directed 
societal role: its use to verify the models that provide the basis for long-term safety 
offers waste management agencies a means of becoming more self-observant; 
simultaneously it gives them a means to become more open and transparent to society, 
providing information to regulators, decision makers and concerned citizens. 
Establishing a legal obligation to monitor, as in Switzerland, or making it a regulatory 
licensing condition, as in Finland, institutionalises the role of monitoring as a tool for 
transparency and societal oversight. This would seem an important step if monitoring is 
to play a part in public confidence building. 
 
But, monitoring can only provide public confirmation that nuclear safety is indeed being 
successfully upheld if society can trust the monitor, or by default trust the institutions 
responsible for supervising the monitor. Even if today we were living in a society where 
general trust in the nuclear industry and in radioactive waste management agencies 
were universally high55, that would not be a guarantee that such levels of trust would 
persist for the next century (assuming that to be about the time until a decision on 
closure might be expected). Additional mechanisms therefore need to be in place to 
assure the monitoring system as a whole could be regarded as trustworthy, both by this 
and future generations. 
 
Most crucial in this is to make sure the implementer is not the only party who has 
‘monitoring responsibilities’, and that there are different parties involved in the 
development, installation, operation of monitoring devices and the analysis of their 
results. Or as one of the experts interviewed put it: 
“I can vividly imagine people will say: ‘Sure we think you should monitor, but we do not want just you to 
produce these devices, install and analyse them'. And if I’m really bad, if I were them, I would ask at least 
for a guarantee on the production and emplacement of any sensors (for if you put them where there is 
                                                        
55
 Risk perception research continuously concludes that this is not the case. Although differences occur between 
countries, the general trends are similar. Results from a U.S. national survey for example showed that only 30% 
of respondents had ‘quite a lot to a great deal’ of trust in the nuclear industry, as compared to 54% for national 
environmental groups and 74% for university scientists (Whitfield et al 2009: 431). 
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nothing to see, well, then you will evidently not measure anything), as well as for some form of independent 
oversight and inspection. These are things that are likely to become issues of negotiation.” (Respondent 5) 
This avoids a situation of potential self-regulation and of implementers becoming the 
judges of their own case. This goes for different types of implementers, both those with a 
(semi)public character and those that are private entities set up by the nuclear industry.  
 
The role of an independent regulator is in that regard an important one. Designing and 
implementing monitoring technologies is one thing, but who is interested in looking at 
the results of monitoring? For monitoring technologies to assist in building public 
confidence in the repository system, they must be political technologies capable of 
winning an audience. The regulator by definition plays an intermediary role between the 
implementer and society, and can be an additional source of trust. In an ideal world, 
there would be strong and competent regulators, working independently from the 
implementer, and guaranteeing to defend the overall good of society at all times. In the 
real world, this may not always be the case (e.g. due to limited state resources, too 
strong a bond between those responsible for policy making and those regulating and 
supervising it, …), or at least not necessarily perceived as such. Adding further 
components to the socio-technical arrangements that make up the totality of the 
monitoring system that could contribute to public trust, today and in the future, could 
therefore be considered.56 As we saw in some of the examples outlined in Section 3, this 
could consist of: introducing (independent) oversight bodies to complement the work of 
the regulator, or to offset any deficit in trust in the regulator’s performance of its 
activities where that has an effect on public confidence; offering concerned stakeholders 
the means to organise ‘independent’ reviews of monitoring activity; engaging concerned 
stakeholders to some extent in monitoring activity; and so forth. While such extensions 
of the arrangements for monitoring might in some contexts be felt by stakeholders to be 
completely unnecessary, the examples described earlier, from a wide range of settings, 
suggest that they can help to address stakeholder concerns where these exist and 
thereby contribute to building confidence in the system.  
 
 
                                                        
56
 This conceives of the ‘monitoring system’ not simply as a technical system that collects, analyses and 
represents data from the repository system, but also as including the set of institutional, organisational and social 
arrangements, activities and relationships within which this technical activity is embedded. When stakeholders 
evaluate a technological system they do not consider only the technology, but also the social context in which it 
is produced and operated, managed and mismanaged, and which provides the technology and its operations with 
meaning and purpose: in other words, as a socio-technical system. 
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4.3.2 Monitoring the Monitor: the Role of the Regulator 
Even though radioactive waste managers today take the lead in setting up monitoring 
programmes and developing monitoring strategies, regulators are also considered key 
players in the monitoring system. First because they set guidelines and regulations on 
what they expect from a monitoring programme (already well-established for 
operational and environmental assessment monitoring, and in some countries currently 
under development for monitoring in view of long-term safety). Second because of their 
role in issuing nuclear licences and in maintaining oversight of the safety of all nuclear 
facilities under their jurisdiction. It is in that respect likely regulators will expect certain 
monitoring activities, some of which may become explicit license conditions. 
 
Regulatory bodies or safety authorities can in that respect be considered as ‘monitors 
who monitor the monitor’. Indeed, because of the complexity of the issue, the inexpert 
public is going to have to call on the services of those resembling scientific connoisseurs 
(Evans and Plows 2007: 832) of repository safety capable of advising whether elaborate 
sights and signs of safety should be accepted as warranting public belief. To a large 
extent this diverts the issue of trust to the relationship between the public and its 
regulatory bodies. Here society at large will be left hoping that their national safety 
authorities, as their scientific guardians of nuclear safety will be able to see through, and 
move behind, the accumulated walls of data while continuing to remain dedicated to 
upholding the larger public interest in the process. 
 
Particularly in relation to in situ monitoring for long-term safety, both the concept of the 
safety case taken as the basis for long-term safety, and the technologic nature and 
specificities of the apt monitoring activities are highly expert driven and therefore 
almost inaccessible and incomprehensible to anyone who is not a highly specialised 
expert. The task of the regulator as go-between scrutinizing the activities of the 
implementer and translating in their own way the complex messages from monitoring 
data to understandable information on repository behaviour is not an easy one. The 
public has no real way of verifying either the implementer’s or the regulator’s 
interpretation of these highly sophisticated data and can only trust the safety authorities 
to do their jobs properly. As noted previously, a regulatory body is just as much a black-
boxed expert system as the repository management system, and therefore demands that 
citizens place their trust in expert systems. However, as also pointed out above, 
perceptions of what Freudenburg (1993) called ‘recreancy’ or unintentional institutional 
failure can have a corrosive effect on trust in an agency to function competently and in 
the best interests of the ordinary citizen. It is telling, for example, that a recent review of 
past research studies that was carried out for the US Blue Ribbon Commission on 
Nuclear Waste found that neither the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, nor the 
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Department of Energy enjoyed a strong level of public trust, driven in great part by 
perceptions of past mistakes and failures (Tuler and Kasperson 2011). 
 
A first element in assuring that there is potential for trust in the regulator is the overall 
framework of roles and responsibilities with regard to a countries radioactive waste 
management policy. Regardless of whether the role of implementer is given to the 
nuclear industry or to a state organisation, the regulator would have to be an 
independent body, with the means to perform its role appropriately (Weyman et al 
2006; Bickerstaff et al 2008). Litmanen (2008) for example refers to the Finnish safety 
authorities financing their own ‘independent’ research to help them in their evaluation 
of Posiva’s research and planning, and to help them prepare for their decision-making. 
Second this is about past experiences the public or particular actor groups have with the 
regulator; the extent to which regulators’ track records suggest them to be trustworthy 
(see also Tuler and Kasperson 2011; NEA 2012c). A third element is the attitude of the 
regulator towards the public and specific stakeholder groups. In the past, regulators 
tended to steer away from getting involved with stakeholder engagement activity. The 
reason most heard for this, was wanting to avoid taking positions on issues (such as a 
safety case) too early in the process and thus risking to hamper the independence of a 
licence application review (Bergmans 2007; Kojo 2006). However, this position seems to 
be shifting, and the role of the regulator is evolving with the growing consideration for 
stakeholder engagement in the decision making on radioactive waste management. One 
such change in role, is that in several countries to date, regulators have become involved 
in public and stakeholder engagement activity, by providing independent expertise for 
local communities (NEA 2004b). The Finnish and Swedish regulators, for example, by 
positioning themselves as defenders of the public interest and ‘allies’ of the potential 
host communities, have gained the trust of the local communities involved in the siting 
process for the geological repository (Elam and Sundqvist 200657; Varjoranta, Lucander 
in NEA 2002). A final element that could aid trust building is the introduction of 
organisational changes that open up the opaque ‘black box’ of regulatory and 
implementer systems of expertise, the basis of much of their decision making and 
therefore a critical element for citizens and stakeholders to understand. The 
accompanying increase in transparency could enhance public insight into how these 
systems work and of course enhance stakeholders’ capacity to subject these decision 
making systems to more informed scrutiny; this may not always be a comfortable 
experience for the regulator but it could also work to reduce the sense that decisions are 
being made – or even that deals are being struck – behind closed doors which has been a 
perceived feature of regulation in many countries.  
                                                        
57
 The authors cite in this respect the municipal authorities of Oskarshamn: ‘The government authorities are our 
experts: SKI and SSI participate throughout the siting process, our decisions are made after these authorities 
have expressed their views.’ (www.oskarshamn.se/lko, 2005) 
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4.3.3 Monitoring the Monitor: Additional Mechanisms for Building Trust 
Such ‘opening up’ could be organised through mechanisms that provide concerned 
actors, stakeholders and interest groups with the ability to intervene, to verify, contrast 
and contest claims made by the repository operator. By setting up arenas and 
mechanisms for traceability and control, greater transparency could be achieved, with 
implementers not stating: “Trust us, we know what we are doing.”, but rather: “Test us to 
decide if we are trustworthy.”58.  
 
Here we will focus on three mechanisms that we think could be of value to consider 
when putting in place an institutional framework for conducting monitoring:  
- engaging independent oversight bodies;  
- providing for local public arenas where monitoring results can be discussed and 
‘put to trial’;  
- give concerned actors the means and opportunity to call for second opinions or 
counter-expertise. 
 
We see these mechanisms as being complementary to each other and as providing 
additional checks and balances, without in any way replacing the role of the regulatory 
agency or releasing it from its legal responsibilities. Together these different 
mechanisms may contribute to a more stable, traceable, transparent and trusted 
monitoring system59.  Although such mechanisms could be put in place solely for the 
purpose of increasing confidence in technical monitoring activities, it would be both 
more coherent and very likely more effective if they were embedded within the overall 
approach to governance of the repository process (from pre-siting to post-closure). 
 
4.3.3.1 Independent oversight bodies 
One additional tool to enrich the institutional context for monitoring could be to make 
use of existing (or newly created) oversight bodies that are (or could become) 
recognised for their independence. Existing examples include: the French National 
Commission for Evaluation (CNE – la commission national de l’évaluation), the UK 
Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM), the Swedish National Council 
for Nuclear Waste (Kärnafvallsrådet), or the US Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board 
(NWTRB). Such oversight bodies have a broader role in providing checks and balances 
                                                        
58
 This paraphrases an intervention during a plenary discussion at a conference on societal aspects of radioactive 
waste management (SKB Spring Talks, 3-4 May 2011, Stockholm), and echoes a phrase adopted by the US 
Chemical Manufacturers’ Association in the late-1980s as a slogan for its Responsible Care programme: “don’t 
trust us, track us” (see Simmons and Wynne 1993).  
59
 ‘Monitoring system’ here refers to the overall socio-technical framework of monitoring arrangements (see also 
footnote 56). 
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concerning the management of radioactive waste in their country. In that regard they 
could take up an additional, explicit role in watching over a monitoring programme and 
scrutinizing implementers’ analysis of monitoring results.  
 
Such oversight bodies typically play a role at a national level. However, the most direct 
concerns regarding the safety of the repository may well come from local communities 
situated close to the repository site. This suggests that there may be a place for 
additional mechanisms at different levels to facilitate discussions on monitoring results, 
or more broadly on the safety of the repository today and in the future. 
 
4.3.3.2 Public arenas at a local level to discuss safety issues and monitoring results 
As with the oversight bodies, we do not envisage specific local arenas that are set in 
place for the sole purpose of debating monitoring results and the interpretation of data. 
Monitoring, as argued elsewhere in this report, is part of a bigger picture and should be 
treated within that context.  
 
Within the logic of the stepwise decision-making model put forward by the NEA (2004a) 
and gradually implemented in many countries today, it seems likely arenas installed 
today to discuss (pre-)siting issues will continue or evolve to enable stakeholder 
engagement after siting, through licensing, construction and during operations. Such 
arenas, often situated at a local level, can provide a forum for discussing monitoring 
results. Examples of already existing arenas of this type would be: the Östhammar 
Community Groups in Sweden, the French CLIS, the UK Managing Radioactive Waste 
Safely (MRWS) partnerships or the Belgian local partnerships for the LILW repository in 
Dessel. 
 
As discussed in Section 3 of this report, active engagement of a local community can be 
considered a valuable option for environmental monitoring. Such an approach seems far 
less realistic with regard to monitoring for long-term safety. However, this does not 
mean concerned communities could not in one way or other be engaged or participate in 
discussing the interpretation of monitoring results and what this means for the long-
term safety of the repository. Having their own space to invite the implementer to make 
his case and the regulator to report on his safety analysis can provide a first step.  
 
4.3.3.3 Enabling stakeholders to engage independent expertise 
However, if we really want to enable concerned citizens and citizens’ groups to ‘audit’ 
the actions of the implementer, they not only need a platform, but also access to 
independent expertise, to people and organisations they can call upon as their own 
‘scientific connoisseurs’ (Evans and Plows 2007: 832). Such type of ‘empowerment 
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measures’ (NEA 2002: 12) can be provided through centralised funding or on a 
contractual basis between an implementer or government and a specific community or 
stakeholder group. An example of the former is the Swedish Nuclear Waste Fund, from 
which concerned municipalities (since 1996) and environmental NGOs (as of 2004) can 
get financial support to participate in the EIA process connected with site investigations. 
With this funding, the community of Oskarshamn for example managed to mobilise 
external expertise previously employed by SKB and SKI, making radioactive waste 
management just as much ‘their’ business, as that of SKB and the regulator(s) (Elam and 
Sundqvist 2006: 45). An example of the latter is the funding provided by ONDRAF/NIRAS 
to the local partnerships for the LIWL repository project in Belgium, which among other 
things enabled them to command research on their behalf and invite experts of their 
choice to give their views on the issues at hand (Bergmans et al 2006: 70). 
 
Both of these examples concern general funding schemes during a siting process, but 
similar initiatives could be envisaged during the stages of construction and operation (as 
was for example set as a condition for acceptance by the Belgian local partnerships). But 
as we saw in Section 3, concrete examples also exist of such empowerment mechanisms 
specifically related to monitoring activity such as the funding provided by the US DOE to 
the State of Nevada, 10 affected counties, and the Timbisha Shoshone Tribe to enable 
them to conduct independent scientific oversight on the Yucca Mountain project and to 
support the independent monitoring of the environmental impact of the WIPP 
(Bergmans 2010; NEA 2010a). Two of the French experts we interviewed referred to 
another, more ad hoc example of a situation in which the CLIS commissioned 
independent analyses of monitoring data collected by Andra in the Bure area. It was 
remarked that this may be more difficult with near-field monitoring, but that the 
possibility should not be excluded. 
4.4 Monitoring as a Sign of Scientific Humility 
The generally accepted view that repository programmes evolve in a stepwise manner 
has put more of an emphasis on the role of monitoring; particularly in view of a final 
decision to close the facility, which is generally considered a milestone decision 
involving regulatory and most likely political approval. Additionally, the progressive 
construction, operation and closure of the repository ‘gives rise to the opportunity to 
associate a series of decision points to the disposal process from initial construction 
until closure’ (MoDeRn 2011: 41). Such decisions are likely to be based, at least in part, 
on the output of a repository monitoring programme. Monitoring would therefore seem 
to have the potential of becoming a very important contributory element in determining 
the progress of the repository process. 
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If moving stepwise is the way forward for implementing geological disposal facilities, 
then this will have to be so over a considerably long period of time, thus having an 
impact on the aspirations and practices of monitoring itself. The MoDeRn Contexts 
Report indeed states that monitoring results are generally assumed to provide a 
significant basis for decisions on further disposal process management, including 
decisions to ‘evolve, reduce or end monitoring activities’ (MoDeRn 2011: 42). But even if 
the waste emplacement process is likely to last several decades, in many cases in the 
order of a century, some natural evolutions operate over time scales which are 
substantially longer, making them ‘inaccessible to direct confirmatory monitoring’ 
(MoDeRn 2011: 49). This directly touches the question of post-closure monitoring and 
the extent to which a societal need will remain for some continued monitoring at that 
stage. 
 
This brings us back to the question of how much vigilance and for how long. As 
Weinberg pointed out, this is in essence a societal choice. But society and its decision 
makers cannot do this without making some commitment to trust in the repository 
system (or in the people implementing and inspecting it). Such commitment will be 
easier to make if during the progressive stages of conceptualisation, siting, licensing, 
construction and operation, there is the possibility to evaluate and to some extent 
reconsider this placing of trust. Monitoring (of different types, not restricted to in-situ 
monitoring) can help to demonstrate that the operator of the disposal programme 
acknowledges that there are remaining uncertainties and is willing to take precautions  
by being alert to unexpected evolutions of the repository system. In that respect, it 
would seem advisable to revisit the notion of stepwise decision making, with a stronger 
focus on possible steps between the start of construction and operations, and the aimed 
for closure of a facility. As far as governance questions, and public and stakeholder 
engagement in decision making in radioactive waste management go, the focus so far 
has mainly been on steps towards implementation (that is, siting and constructing) final 
disposal facilities. However, if we consider no disposal programme final before full 
closure of the facility (a position we can derive from most – if not all – of our sources 
pointing to the need to strive for passive safety), then more attention should be paid to 
the processes through which such a decision will or could be taken and how different 
actors could and should be engaged in that. 
 
It appears that most radioactive waste and repository experts currently take the view 
that in situ repository monitoring will gradually decline and end with repository closure, 
not least because of the need to bar any form of instrumental intrusion that could 
compromise safety but also because of the limitations of contemporary monitoring 
technologies. To leave the decision to reduce and finally end monitoring to 
implementers and regulators would demand a huge commitment of trust from society; 
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whether that would be forthcoming would depend very much on the state of relations 
between those organisations and those affected by their decisions. It may be, however, 
that society is not willing to make such a commitment and to leave such decisions to 
operators and regulators. Better then to obviate this possibility and the negative effects 
on confidence and on practical relationships that would almost inevitably result from 
any emergent conflict by incorporating societal interests in decision making throughout 
the process. Similarly, given that scientists and technical experts are often accused of 
hubris and of a failure to recognise the risks attendant upon the limits of their 
knowledge60, broadening the debate on monitoring objectives to consider not only the 
‘known unknowns’, but also the possibility of ‘unknown unknowns’ occurring (see for 
example Böschen et al 2006; Stirling 2006), would show humility and recognition of the 
impossibility to foresee or plan for all contingencies.61 It is important to acknowledge 
that the problems posed by different sources and types of uncertainty are not currently 
being ignored, indeed are being addressed in geological disposal research 
programmes.62 Nevertheless, our point is that such possibilities need to be explicitly 
considered in the dialogue about developing monitoring objectives, and considered in a 
way that is open to societal input and responsive to societal expectations and concerns. 
This contains the risk of putting into question the premise of long-term passive safety as 
the geotechnical alternative to societal vigilance, or of delaying the move to final closure 
of a repository, but given convincing evidence during the staged process of geological 
disposal there is no reason to assume that this is inevitable.  
 
Indeed, whereas monitoring could be seen as a sign of technological humility, one should 
also retain some humility about what monitoring can, and most notably cannot, deliver. 
A serious discussion of the limits to monitoring (including what could realistically be 
expected in terms of evolutions in monitoring techniques) should therefore be held 
early in the siting process, and not be restricted to the expert community, to allow for 
negotiation of objectives in the early stages of a programme so that societal expectations 
of monitoring information can be reconciled with feasibility constraints, without 
impairing the function that the repository system is intended to perform for society. 
                                                        
60
 See for example the discussions in Freudenburg (1988); Wynne (2001). 
61
 The corollary of this, of course, is the need to acknowledge the fallibility of human institutions for the 
management of risk, however well designed they may be. This may result from an ‘atrophy of vigilance’ over 
time, especially in circumstances where nothing unexpected occurs for an extended period, or from some other 
form of institutional failure (Freudenburg 1992; 1993). Stakeholders are often acutely aware of this fallibility 
but, as we saw in Section 3, may reconcile mistrust of specific institutions with a desire for the maintenance of 
institutional control of a hazard by demanding more participatory forms of oversight or, as discussed in this 
section, a system of checks and balances that ensure independent monitoring of the monitors. A principle of 
humility and openness to the perspectives of non-experts has been advocated as a more general principle in 
relation to the deployment of expertise in policy (Jasanoff 2003). 
62
 For example, in the European Commission’s recent project on Performance Assessment Methodologies in 
Application (PAMINA), 2006-2009: http://www.ip-pamina.eu/index.html.  
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What is considered technically feasible may, of course, be rather different by the time 
that a particular repository programme begins the construction and operation phase. In 
any case, although we offer no prescriptions here, as the extent of any divergence 
between societal expectations and feasibility will not only be highly contextual, due to 
differences in national legislative and regulatory requirements and stakeholder 
demands, but resolution will be a matter for negotiation between implementer, national 
regulator and stakeholders. 
 
The extent to which stakeholders view monitoring as a potential threat to the integrity 
of repositories, will depend on how they view the work of isolating radioactive waste 
from the biosphere as best progressing, and on the trust they are willing to put in the 
repository experts and their system. By introducing the notion of, respectively, 
retrievability or reversibility into law, Switzerland and France are already moving 
towards a more explicitly socio-technical solution to the social problem of radioactive 
waste: one that ultimately still relies on passive safety, but which puts this end point 
much further out than initially planned in order to accommodate societal caution about 
committing to this type of endeavour. Such evolutions confront us more directly with 
the fact that we will inevitably pass burdens on to next generations (e.g. the decision to 
close – or not – the facility). By acknowledging this, rather than by clinging to the 
unachievable goal of current generations settling the issue once and for all, it is possible 
to think more clearly about the information, knowledge and skills that need to be passed 
on to future generations in order for them to know and to exercise their options in light 
of future evolutions of a repository. Monitoring, it would seem, could play an important 
role by providing future operators, regulators, decision-makers and other concerned 
parties with valuable information. But again, one needs to remain modest about what 
information monitoring can deliver. Indeed, it has been pointed out to us that even if 
monitoring should give unexpected and apparently adverse results which suggest that 
‘something’ is wrong, it need not necessarily mean that long-term safety is impaired. The 
question then is whether future generations will have the expertise to determine 
whether that is the case rather than simply intervening in some way, either to 
investigate or to retrieve the waste. The simple answer is that we cannot know but if 
there is an assumption among experts, which typically seems to be the case, that in the 
foreseeable future science and technology will continue to progress, the corollary must 
be that future generations capable of continuing to monitor will be as capable of 
interpreting any ‘unexpected’ results as current experts, and likely more capable if the 
knowledge and techniques available to them have advanced as expected. In the much 
longer timescale that raises questions about societal stability and cultural persistence 
(‘cultural’ here including the specific forms of knowledge that we know as science) it is 
hard to see how new forms of monitoring could be developed, to replace what would by 
then be the defunct monitoring systems established during repository construction and 
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operation, and would be functioning without a corresponding set of institutional 
competences (both scientific and administrative). Nevertheless, we do consider that in 
view of decisions to be made by current generations, leaving options for monitoring to 
evolve and to respond to changes in the expected evolution of the repository (e.g. 
closure being postponed for one reason or other), it could reduce the requirement for 
unquestioning trust in those managing the radioactive waste by establishing for those 
who are ‘placing the bet’ means to exercise a form of control over the objects of their 
trust, as well as providing the reassurance of a potential back-up arrangement.  
 
   MoDeRn 
D-1.3.1_Final_30-10-2012 
79 
5   General Conclusions 
In this report we have explored expert views on repository monitoring as well as 
reviewing what the social science research literature tells us about the expectations and 
motivations that are likely to influence lay stakeholders’ attitudes towards monitoring. 
The exploratory stakeholder engagement exercises planned in the next phase of this 
research will build upon this review and are intended to supplement the inferences, 
reported above, that we have drawn from the research literature. In this final section of 
the report we shall therefore consider the implications of our findings so far for 
engaging different types of stakeholders, in particular lay stakeholders, in defining 
monitoring objectives and strategies.  
 
One thing the expert community definitely agrees upon is that issues of (re)assurance 
and confidence building are among the main drivers for monitoring. The vital question 
then becomes how to organise monitoring in such a way that it answers different 
stakeholders’ expectations, thus contributing to raising their confidence in a repository 
performing to the promised standards of safety.  
 
A first general observation to make is that monitoring is part of a bigger story. 
Monitoring is not an end in itself; rather it is a means to support, in a number of ways, 
the implementation of geological disposal. This suggests that policy and implementation 
bodies should not focus too much on separate engagement activity on monitoring, or 
dwell on specific engagement techniques. Setting aside exploratory research such as that 
to be conducted as part of MoDeRn, one implication of this would be that any 
engagement with stakeholders on monitoring should be set up as part of a wider 
consultation and participation process dedicated to the question of geological disposal. 
Given the potential mediating role that it may play in relation to stakeholder confidence, 
however, it seems on the other hand advisable for existing and emerging stakeholder 
engagement programmes to dedicate due attention to the issue of monitoring. This can 
be considered to apply both at a national level, in relation to general policy questions of 
whether or not to opt for geological disposal and to more specific questions of 
reversibility and retrievability, and at the local level, in relation to implementation of 
national decisions.  
 
A second observation deriving from our research so far is that the way in which people 
view monitoring and what they expect to obtain from it differs according to (among 
other things) the way they view the concept of geological disposal and long-term safety. 
So, on the one hand, some have great confidence in the multi-barrier design providing 
multiple safety functions to ensure long-term safety, seeing monitoring primarily as a 
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means of confirming the models on which they have based the repository design and 
which are used to make the case for long term safety after closure, but as having no 
active safety role in the post-closure phase. Others acknowledge that there may still be 
unresolved uncertainties and that it would likely be necessary to maintain some form of 
monitoring (not necessarily in situ) into the post-closure period if society required 
continued assurances that there were no unexpected evolutions of the repository 
system. This is not simply a matter of a difference between ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ perceptions. 
As the different sections in this report have shown, there is more than one way of 
interpreting passive safety as an alternative to active and virtually perpetual vigilance. 
Background assumptions are often, by their very nature, not made explicit and for those 
holding them may assume, in the course of everyday reinforcement by a like-minded 
community of practice, the unreflective status of common sense. When engaging with 
different types of stakeholders, therefore, those responsible for developing and 
implementing repository monitoring strategies as part of national HLW repository 
programmes will not only need to take into account the existence of different 
conceptualisations but also to focus their interactions with stakeholders on making 
explicit what lies behind different actors’ views on monitoring, including their own. 
 
Third, and related to this, is that we found monitoring could be part of the answer to the 
societal expectation that vigilance should be maintained at all times. Whether we like it 
or not, burdens will inevitably be passed on to future generations. First, because in most 
programmes it seems unlikely that geological repositories will be closed by the same 
generation who build them. Second, because certainty and safety can never be 
guaranteed. By broadening the debate on monitoring objectives to consider how to 
register things previously unthought-of and thus considering not only the ‘known 
unknowns’, but also by considering the problem of ‘unknown unknowns’, experts, so 
often accused of hubris, can show humility and recognition of the impossibility to 
foresee and plan for all contingencies. This also means showing preparedness to discuss 
monitoring issues not only in view of preparing for closure (the main purpose for 
monitoring from a technical expert perspective), but also with regard to a post-closure 
phase, or in view of a preliminary abandonment of the site, or final closure being 
indeterminately postponed for one reason or other.  
However, this does not mean such issues need to be settled here and now for the full 
length of the disposal process. What seems important is that monitoring programmes 
are designed so that they remain flexible enough to cater to changing social and 
regulatory expectations placed among them. To continue building confidence, both the 
product and process of monitoring will have to continue meeting different stakeholders’ 
expectations, while staying within the limits of what is scientifically sound and both 
technically and financially feasible. When developing and maintaining monitoring 
programmes, a two-way interaction with different types of stakeholders is needed, in 
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order to get these elements integrated and in balance. The weighing of these elements 
against each other is something that concerns society as a whole, and not something an 
implementer should do on its own; nor should it be left solely to technical regulatory 
decisions. 
This brings us to our fourth observation that in order to develop and sustain societal 
confidence the process of monitoring should be transparent and open to public and 
expert scrutiny. As was argued in this report, this is not done by merely producing data 
and arguing how these corroborate experts’ claims and models. What is as important (if 
not more) is to produce these data in such a way that others have access to them and are 
able to verify how they came about. Again, this is not an issue of monitoring alone, but 
will have to be incorporated into the institutional context by which roles and 
responsibilities for long-term radioactive waste management are organised. Important 
components of such a context include: 
- A framework that establishes the role of monitoring as a tool for increasing 
transparency. 
- An independent regulator which has the means to perform its role appropriately, 
has an excellent track record, and is itself open and transparent towards the 
public. 
- An independent oversight body at the central level, the form of which may differ 
in different countries (e.g. a national review board, or a national oversight 
committee) but which would be distinct from the regulator. 
- Measures to empower concerned stakeholders at the local level in relation to 
monitoring activity, either by engaging external experts of their choosing or 
through active involvement in the monitoring process (for example in 
environmental monitoring). 
The extent to which the additional measures for ‘monitoring the monitors’ outlined in 
the last two bullets are necessary for confidence building will depend very much on the 
(national) context but they reflect solutions described in this report as well as reflecting 
insights offered by research on trust and confidence in the context of technological risk.  
Finally, we conclude that a more fully social (rather than merely psychological) 
conception of trust, as elaborated above, is central to understanding the extent to which 
monitoring may contribute to building confidence in geological disposal. Monitoring 
programmes may well be able to contribute to public and stakeholder confidence in 
long-term radioactive waste management, and specifically geological disposal; this 
requires however not only that we recognize repository monitoring as a socio-technical 
activity requiring social and institutional innovations as much as technical innovation, 
but that this is acted upon. 
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